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INTRODUCTION 
And for what, except for you, do I feel love? 
Do I press the extremest book of the wisest man 
Close to me, hidden in me day and night? 
In the uncertain light of a single, certain truth, 
Equal in living changingness to the light 
In which I meet you, in which we sit at rest, 
For a moment in the central of our being, 
The vivid transparence that you bring is peace. 
Wallace Stevens didn’t particularly enjoy his desk job in Hartford, Connecticut.  Yes, he 
found a quiet kind of happiness in poring over case files at the Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company, a domestic peace in tending his rose garden, and the steady, lukewarmness of his 
family life on Westerly Terrace.  All these gave to the poet a very necessary tether to the real, 
and he did enjoy that reality and the anonymity that came with his life of little consequence in 
Hartford.  But in truth, he was rather more fond of walking.  Stevens never drove a car and 
instead chose every single day to walk from his home to his office, striding nearly two and a half 
miles in his daily gray suit along Hartford’s sunny sidewalks.  He often skipped lunch, and 
instead walked briskly through Elizabeth Park.  And in his notebooks, Stevens records walks of 
prodigious length, including one from Manhattan to Fort Montgomery, almost reaching West 
Point.  It’s a 45 mile trek that would take between 15 and 17 hours, one-way.  He rode the train 
back.   
Head hung upon his chest, muttering soundlessly, his walking took on the metrical 
cadence of language as he composed his poetry upon these private and deeply meditative walks 
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through town.  Occasionally, he would pause and retrace a step, working through some sticky 
metric, or pull a small scrap of paper from his trouser pocket, scribbling a line or two.  Arriving 
at the office, the Vice President would delve into the complex work of acuity insurance, often 
foisting his morning compositions upon his no-nonsense secretary, who would type them up into 
coherent lines, but who had no real idea of what was going-on.  In fact, even when Stevens was 
at the peak of his career, winning several major awards, no one in the office really paid much 
attention to his literary habit.  After his death, several co-workers were actually surprised to learn 
that Stevens exercised creativity at all, having thought of the man only as an excellent acuities 
analyst and a rather closed off, formidable personality.  Everything about Stevens’ very private 
outer life suggests a perfectly ordinary, and rather dull man who occasionally went on very very 
long walks.  There was not much of anything about the Stevens who lived in a white, 
unremarkable house, who walked daily in his three piece suit to work, and who declined any and 
all invitation to eccentricity to suggest the kind of unbridled, tortured passion that one might 
associate with one of the greatest poetic minds of the 20th century.   
Perhaps Stevens’ poetry is all the more consummate because it was an indulgence of an 
otherwise prude, buttoned-up type of man.  It was not his every waking minute, not his only 
recourse day and night.  Stevens had his very own puritan-like life, complete with separate 
bedrooms for him and his wife, a wooden desk in a cramped office-room, and an unfailing 
clockwork-like daily schedule, roast beef and martinis at the club on Wednesdays, the occasional 
business trip, but rarely leaving Connecticut.  In Stevens’ marriage to Elsie, who preferred a 
more social life to Stevens’ quiet one and who never really understood her husband’s creative 
tendencies, he did not find a muse or a confidant.  He remained faithful to her until his death, just 
as he continued to show up to work even after his retirement.  Stevens’ affair was, in every 
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sense, an affair with poetry.  And Stevens met with his poetry daily on his walks to and from the 
office.  “And for what, except for you, do I feel love?”  In this way, Stevens chooses to begin 
“Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” the ultimate poem about poetry, and what many consider his 
masterpiece.  Usually, this kind of blank address would be cast at a muse, at the poet’s impetus 
for rhyme, that mythic or very real figure who makes the work of poetry-writing possible, even 
enjoyable.  It is altogether fitting that Stevens’ muse is poetry itself, and that he should address it 
so adoringly, lingering through light and shadow as he walks step for step with the love of his 
life, with those cadences delicately murmured, hastily scribbled, the continual surprise of words 
and lines that accompanied him daily to the office. 
         I first met with Stevens’ proclivity for walking while walking myself.  I was buried in 
this very same poem, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” and came across the lines, “Perhaps/ 
the truth depends on a walk around the lake.”  Now this speaks not only to a fundamental 
element of Stevens’ poetic theory, but also to the central place that walking has in it: “The vivid 
transparence that you bring is peace.”  Perhaps this line would not have caught my attention in 
this way had I not been walking myself when I read it.  And when I began to learn about 
Stevens’ life in Hartford and about the importance of his commute to his creative output, it 
brought me to thoughts of my own daily commute across campus and the way that this mile-long 
walk has shaped my semesters here, and has provided a both a very real and a symbolic 
framework for my senior project.  Every footfall to this very deliberate route I have committed to 
memory: out the side door, weaving between two giant oaks, across the parking lot, along the 
grassy path through bits of thicket, a sloping/rolling sidewalk, through the wood-chipped 
graveyard, past the fountain, over alternating patches of grass, pavement, and mud toward my 
morning class.  As I walk, a liberated mind welcomes what might come out of fresh air.  The 
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feeling of composing while walking is describable for me only as a kind of abstracted alertness, a 
wakefulness in dreaming that breeds thoughts and fancies only possible out of doors.   
Like Stevens, I love city-walking.  I could trek Manhattan top to bottom—and I have, once.  But 
it is only fitting that the other essential half of this project was also prolific walker, one who 
enjoyed his fresh air a little crisper, and from a greater height.  In fact, Friedrich Nietzsche might 
more accurately be called a hiker.  On these hikes, Nietzsche carried small notebooks in which 
he wrote some of his foremost works in their entirety.  The mountain-man, Zarathustra, came to 
Nietzsche while walking and scrambling in the Swiss Alps, “6000 feet beyond man and time” 
(Basic 751).  Nietzsche walked for sometimes more than six hours a day as part of his creative 
process and also to alleviate the painful migraines he suffered almost daily for most of his life, 
finding that the fresh air around the countryside and at greater altitudes helped to dull the pain in 
his head.  Nietzsche made clear his affinity for hiking frequently in his journal entries and in his 
philosophical works themselves: “It is our habit to think outdoors—walking, leaping, climbing, 
dancing, preferably on lonely mountains or near the sea where even the trails become 
thoughtful” (The Gay Science 366). 
The philosophy of the future, for Nietzsche, is comprised of thoughts born of the open 
air.  French philosopher, Frederic Gros, devotes an entire chapter of his book, A Philosophy of 
Walking, to Nietzsche.  The chapter is entitled “Why I am such a Good Walker,” a humorous 
reference to the section headings of Ecce Homo.  In it, Gros tracks several of Nietzsche’s 
prodigious climbs and collects some of his journal entries such as this one in which Nietzsche 
writes, “I am walking a lot, through the forest, and having tremendous conversations with myself 
(15). 
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Hiking has only more recently become a part of my life, but already I find that it provides 
me with the kind of clarity that Nietzsche extolls.  I find that, upon great height and in pure air, 
ideas form freely and in their entirety, and that larger scenarios are much easier to unfold when 
viewed from above.  In the earliest stages of this project, I had written its outline on a trail map 
of the Devil’s Path, a 24 mile-long hike in the Catskill mountain range.  Like Nietzsche, I also 
find that a sweeping view and a good bit of rock scrambling can help distract a migraine for a 
time.  There is a singular feeling to composing one’s thoughts in the open air, upon a winding, 
upward mountain trail.   
         “Only thoughts that are reached by walking have value,” Nietzsche writes in Twilight of 
the Idols.  I am dealing, in this project, with two profound minds who were both quite literally 
“forward thinking.”  Stevens and Nietzsche, in their own overlapping corners/genres/oeuvres of 
walking-compositions, served to propel faith and language into the modern age.  This is a project 
about moving on, and that its creative stimuli—in the act of composition—could neither of them 
be content to sit still, is in fact quite significant/telling.  Is there any better way to move on than 
simply to keep walking, and to write into the future as one walks?  Nietzsche needed these great 
ascents and descents to scale the situation, to gain a fuller understanding of a problem that was 
only just being realized.  Stevens, in his time, was familiar with Nietzsche’s philosophy and 
knew God’s death for what it was.  Both sought to compose a lasting comfort for a humanity that 
found itself at a loss, and both—as an integral and complementing detail—did so while walking.   
         This is a thesis about God’s death, about its implications, consequences, and about what 
comes after for life’s redemption.  It does not seek to proliferate any specific worldview, nor 
does it mean any disrespect or irreverence to faith and to the faithful.  Indeed, it recognizes faith, 
in its manifestations, as a fundamental necessity to all human life, and seeks, through a new kind 
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of faith—this time a trust in metaphor and its ability to re-enchant the world—to illuminate a 
path toward mastering the threat of nihilism, chaos, and meaninglessness/that has plagued 
Western thought since the 19th century.  Finding this path is of utmost importance and, 
furthermore, necessitates the recognition that humanity must, as a matter of urgency, place its 
earnest faith in something greater than itself to achieve lasting health.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Nietzsche and the Artful Ubermensch 
Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to engage with the death of God in its Nietzschean context, 
dispelling with some common interpretive oversimplifications and defining it more abstractly as 
a potent force of secularism within the world characterized by an inability to believe that feels 
both rampant and inexplicable.  I seek also to illustrate how the death of God leads almost 
inevitably to a confrontation with nihilism, one that has demanded the attention especially of 
existentialist philosophers such as Soren Kierkegaard and Albert Camus.  After, I turn to 
Nietzsche and to an exploration of his own antidote to nihilism through art, a stance that he at 
once advocates and shows a weariness of through his philosophy of depth and his complicated 
stances on language, truth, and poetry. 
Section One: “God is dead.” 
What it Doesn’t Mean 
Nietzsche’s famous dictum, “God is dead,” has lent itself to numerous interpretations, 
from invocations in pop culture to ruminations in the writing of contemporary philosophers and 
theologians.  In this section, I will survey some of these varied interpretations that fall outside the 
scope of this project for two basic reasons.  First, some express a simplified or limited 
understanding of Nietzsche’s words in context with his extended body of work, choosing to 
engage exclusively with this single phrase.  This category of interpretation—which belongs 
largely to pop culture—I will approach first.  Others use the death of God as a jumping off point 
to propel another agenda, often a theological project aimed at rescuing a deity displaced by 
modernity.  Nietzsche’s death of God pronouncement has garnered myriad interpretations, many 
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of them earning merit in their own right; it is necessary to recognize the colossal arrangement of 
cultural engagement and criticism surrounding it.  But in this project, it is my intention to engage 
Nietzsche on his own terms, using his argument to its most basic, unappropriated, and widely 
accepted ends.  It is therefore necessary to leave behind certain readings that burden the 
Nietzschean pronouncement with either too much or too little baggage, and to attempt a work-
through that engages Nietzsche’s own ideas solely.     
Differing interpretations of the death of God often point to a response that is more 
emotional than logical, to a very human propensity to cling to a dying thing for fear of the 
unknown.  It is just as Nietzsche predicted in his very first invocation of God’s death in The Gay 
Science section 108: 
After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a 
tremendous, gruesome shadow.  God is dead; but given the way of men, there 
may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown (GS 
108). 
And indeed, there are those philosophers who, in the very attempt to interpret these words, reveal 
that they themselves are, in some sense, still in the cave watching shadows on the wall. 
To my mind, there are three overlapping categories into which these interpretations may be 
placed.  The first is the belief that God’s death is literal, that Nietzsche is saying that God once 
was, but that he no longer is because we did something to him as an entity.  A big part of this is a 
movement called the “Death of God Theology,” a group that gained traction in the 1960’s as a 
theological response to Nietzsche’s invocation.  They invariably had as their goal to overcome 
the Nietzschean critique from a Christian perspective, but differed mostly on how they sought to 
preserve God through creative interpretations of Nietzsche’s words.  Christian existentialist, Paul 
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Tillich, accepts a certain kind of God as dead in his book, The Courage to Be, but asserts that one 
must go on theologizing and in search of a new deity, a God above God.  Proponents of the 
theory tended to take Nietzsche’s words in stride, not fully coming to terms with the difficulty 
Nietzsche intended.  Martin Buber summarizes, “Nietzsche saying that God is dead, that we have 
slain Him, dramatically sums up the end situation of the era.  But even more eloquent than this 
proclamation...are the attempts to fill the horizon that has been declared empty” (20-21).  Many 
of these theories sought to prove that God’s death, or his metaphysical crucifixion, was somehow 
just a marker on the path to a new, yet more sacred God-figure.   
The popularity of Nietzsche’s Death of God has, unfortunately, subjected it to much 
lackadaisical scrutiny from the pop cultural and pop philosophical community, a community 
whose tendency is almost always to take things to their most literal extreme.  Think of the poster 
hanging in every vaguely philosophical student's dorm room that reads “Nietzsche: ‘God is dead’ 
1883,” then underneath “God: ‘Nietzsche is dead’ 1900.” Again this humorous rendering of the 
phrase rests on a false assumption that Nietzsche was writing about God as an actual entity.  In 
fact, whether or not God is exists is completely irrelevant to Nietzsche’s claim, regardless of 
Nietzsche’s own staunch atheism. 
In 1966, the death of God was reintroduced into pop culture in the cover article of an 
April issue of Time Magazine.  The long-form article, “Toward a Hidden God,” uses Nietzsche’s 
words as a jumping off point for casual observation about an increase in atheism in the current 
age.  What Nietzsche is actually saying is much less passive than a lethargic and removed remark 
that there are rather more atheists than there used to be.  The article goes on the offer the “Death 
of God Theology” as a possible solution to Nietzsche’s conundrum of life without faith.     
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What it Does Mean 
Nietzsche was not the first person to proclaim the death of a deity, but the concept as we 
understand it now philosophically is very much his own.  No one before Nietzsche intended the 
death of God quite the way he did. In his book, Culture and the Death of God, Terry Eagleton 
writes: 
Perhaps it is with Nietzsche that the decisive break comes.  He has a strong claim 
to being the first real atheist.  Of course there had been unbelievers in abundance 
before him, but it is Nietzsche above all who confronts the terrifying, exhilarating 
consequences of the death of God (Eagleton 151). 
What exactly does Nietzsche mean by the death of God?  What he is saying is that within the 
world, God has been supplanted by a way of thinking that renders belief an untenable position.   
He spoke of God not as an entity, but as an idea; “God is a conjecture,” Zarathustra said, and this 
is the way in which Nietzsche speaks of God (85).  Whether or not that conjecture is backed up 
by anything true is of little consequence.  The problem inherent is not the atheism, it is that man 
stands yet atop a structure he does not seem to be aware that he himself has already toppled.   
When he wrote “God is dead,” Nietzsche had in mind our idea of God, mostly the conception of 
the Judeo-Christian God.  In this way, it is not a stance of atheism or a comment about paradise, 
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but a position in the world.  “Godlessness is a force in the world,” wrote Karl Jaspers in his book, 
Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity (437).   
Despite what some of his more vivid metaphors would have us think, Nietzsche is not 
writing of some ichor-bleeding immortal who falls out of the sky or upon a knife.  Rather, he is 
speaking of a disbelief that has slowly infected the world, and further, an inability to believe.  It 
is not simply a kind of atheism, but a general movement toward a growing incapacity to place 
complete faith in something  so doggedly and purposefully unknowable.   Nietzsche speaks of 
the phenomena by which the theology of the old gods comes to ring false in modern ears.  In a 
world where nothing can be believed absolutely, it is unnatural to think that a god can save 
humanity any longer.   
Nietzsche argues that humans have come to a point when they can no longer put faith in 
these things, these networks of deities and ethical imperatives that soldered together a 
disconnected, amorphous, and untrustworthy universe.  Because that is what they did: they 
provided a faith system through which to untangle the world, to make life more manageable, and 
to firmly delineate categories of right and wrong.  He is proclaiming the death of God within the 
world as the dramatic finale to a way of life, as the windup and release of everything mankind 
had, since nearly the beginning, thought to be true and just.  With the Nietzschean line of 
argument, philosophy enters its most terrifying phase, one marked continually by the threat of 
nihilism, an era in which the natural path for humankind verges on disillumination.    “He 
recognized nihilism for what it was and examined it like a clinical fact,” Camus writes of 
Nietzsche (Rebel 855).  Nietzsche is among those philosophers courageous enough to examine, 
for what it is, the terror of a world forsaken by God. 
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Section Two: The Imperative 
Modern secular societies...have effectively disposed of God but find it morally and 
politically convenient—even imperative—to behave as though they have not...God 
is too vital a piece of ideology to be written off… (Eagleton 157) 
Another crucial realization in all of this is that, when Nietzsche proclaims the death of 
God, this is a death after which we cannot just go on living as before.  Nietzsche is all deadpan.  
He realizes the gravity of the situation at which God is—was—at the very center, holding up 
rather precariously an innately fabricated structure of values and ideas.   And when God departs 
from the scene, or is thrown out of it, there is a sudden retreat and utter disappearance of other 
kinds of meaning.  The philosopher calls out hoping to find some vestige of the divine lurking 
somewhere near, and is met with the world, silent, predatory, animal.  It will not be met with 
reason.  Eagleton writes on this graveness with which Nietzsche speaks of the departing God: 
Nietzsche sees that civilization is in the process of ditching divinity while still 
clinging to religious values, and that this egregious act of bad faith must not go 
uncontested.  You cannot kick away the foundations and expect the building still 
to stand.  The death of God, he argues in The Joyful Wisdom, is the most 
momentous event of human history, yet men and women are behaving as though 
it were no more than a minor readjustment (156).   
There is a realization that God’s death is a slow process.  As Nietzsche says, it may take 
thousands of years, even.  But when the realization does hit, the reaction of the madman is no 
exaggeration.  It is a sudden and unwanted confrontation with the silence of the world, with 
existence itself and its arbitrariness.  Not only the state of utter disorientation, but the sheer 
gravity of the deed, command attention.  The madman appears:    
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‘How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?  What was 
holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under 
our knives: who will wipe this blood off us?  What water is there for us to clean 
ourselves?  What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to 
invent?  Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us?  Must we ourselves not 
become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (The Gay Science 125).   
The words of the madman foreshadow a stance that Nietzsche will take in his philosophy toward 
man and his project within this new, emptied world.  But they echo a sentiment of panic felt all 
over by a people lacking a guide, a people suddenly embedded with chaos.  From this feeling, 
from the response to this momentous event, springs nihilism.  It happens when enchantment is 
withdrawn from the social, linguistic, and perceptual world.  When God is dead, humanity loses 
much more than a deity.  Lost are the virtues and vices wrapped up with him, the theology and 
the morality upon which entire civilizations and social structures are built.  When God is dead, 
giant networks built around faith come crumbling down.  They are networks that Nietzsche 
thought were “sick” anyhow, but cities nonetheless.  In Nietzsche’s words, “The trust in life is 
gone.  Life itself has become a problem.  Yet one should not jump to the conclusion that this 
necessarily makes one gloomy.  Even love of life is still possible, only one loves differently” 
(The Gay Science 37). 
Section Three: Existentialism and the God Conundrum 
Nietzsche says that, despite the crumbling of God and his kingdom, love of life remains a 
possibility.  But it must be a different love.  It is important to note, also, that other relative 
contemporaries of Nietzsche devoted much of their energy toward finding solutions to the God 
conundrum.  It was their way of stepping in as humanity, without God, found itself continually at 
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a loss.  There are two in particular upon whose work I would like to concentrate in this section: 
Sören Kierkegaard and Albert Camus.  I do not plan to go deeply into either of their 
philosophies, but think it is necessary to show two differing responses in order to, if nothing else, 
elucidate the unique and bold strokes of Nietzsche’s philosophical undertaking.  
Kierkegaard was a rather curious type of philosopher, coming out of Denmark in the 
early 19
th
 century.  He is perhaps best known for his use of elaborate pseudonyms, which he 
continually insisted were completely separate from himself.  Noteworthy, is the maddened and 
abysmal way in which Kierkegaard confronted what he called “despair.”  In “The Sickness Unto 
Death,” Anti-Climacus writes on the stages with which a God-lost society confronts despair, 
ranging from those who lie to themselves, to those who despair defiantly, who feel the sorrow all 
the way to their core.  Some other philosophers, including Camus—ever the proponent of a good 
rebellion—praise Kierkegaard for his candid and austere confrontation with despair, yet find his 
final resolution quite puzzling, even cowardly.  Kierkegaard became known for his “leap of 
faith,” or the point at which he decided that, to move forward, it is necessary to accept God.  It is 
fascinating to see a philosopher who both understood the gloom of an unceremoniously dumped 
society and who found a way to still accept a God.  
         Camus was a direct opponent of Kierkegaard’s leap of faith or “philosophical suicide,” as 
he called it.  Camus was basically an existentialist in that he thought the most fundamental 
decision in life was the choice—having seen the state of an absurd world—to live or die.  He 
recognized that choice as a hard one.  Nevertheless, he felt no qualms about calling out those 
who he thought had made the wrong decision.  Camus found Kierkegaard’s acquisition to faith 
was little more than a way of giving up, of acknowledging the world as a problem too complex 
for him.   
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         Camus sought almost the opposite.  He spoke of rebellion just as Kierkegaard did in “The 
Sickness Unto Death,” but Camus would never allow for the acceptance of God.  Like Nietzsche, 
he felt that society had seen and experienced far too much for it.  The world, for Camus and for 
many others, was absurd, meaning that it is completely silent always, refusing to give any 
reason, any explanation for existence.  The acceptance of this is difficult; Camus speaks of 
absurdity as a feeling that one comes up against quite suddenly, disallowing one from seeing the 
world, as it once was, in the veils that covered it.  Camus’ solution, quite contrary to that of both 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, is to accept the world exactly as it is, painful as it is, and to leave it 
completely unadorned, uncolored by things that might make its acceptance easier.  Camus’ 
model man is one who practices an uncommon rebellion, a rebellion through accepting the 
unacceptable.  He gives the example of Sisyphus grinning, mocking his punishers, as he rolls the 
rock over and over again.   
Section Four: A Skeptical Faith 
Art.  That is the Nietzschean proposition against nihilism.  And what Nietzsche proposes, 
furthermore, is an art that is deified as the proud marker of the creative achievement of man.  
With art, the death of God moves from a lamenting and confused declaration to a celebration 
because of what it makes possible, because of the way it makes room for the elevation of man.  
In the earlier sections of The Gay Science, including the first declaration of God’s death in 
section 108 and the madman from 125, Nietzsche reveals an uncertainty about how to proceed.  
In 108, the death of God comes more as a prediction that will come to be realized over thousands 
of years.  And in section 125, the madman comes too soon, frantically declaring it an act to great 
for man and says, “Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?”  This is a 
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foreshadowing of where Nietzche’s estimation of man is indeed headed, but in this moment, the 
madman reveals a sentiment that humankind has overstepped its abilities.  
But in the fifth and final section of The Gay Science—which was amended to the book 
after he had completed Thus Spoke Zarathustra—Nietzsche speaks of God’s death in a 
completely new light.  In fact, section 343, the first section of part five is actually called “The 
reason for our cheerfulness­.”  Nietzsche speaks of the death of God, calling it “the greatest 
recent event.”  He writes, “Are we perhaps still too much under the impression of the initial 
consequences of this event—and these initial consequences, the consequences for ourselves, are 
quite the opposite of what one might perhaps expect: They are not at all sad and gloomy but 
rather like a new and scarcely describable kind of light, happiness, relief, exhilaration, 
encouragement, dawn (The Gay Science 343).  Here, he acknowledges the “initial 
consequences,” even putting it in italics to set out the seriousness of the dilemma that God’s 
death proposed.  After those consequences, after the threat of nihilism is wholly realized, the 
death of God can become a celebration because realized through it is mankind’s incredible 
capacity to create.  Art, for Nietzsche, is an exercise that places incredible agency back into the 
hands of man.  As Nietzsche goes on to write in section 343, “At long last the horizon appears 
free to us again…”  Thus the death of God transforms into a cheerful event through which 
mankind reclaims the world and reasserts itself as the most central entity within it.  This 
cheerfulness is what proclaims Nietzsche to write in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the book that is his 
transition between The Gay Science and the amended section five, “‘…for I love even the 
churches and tombs of gods, once the sky gazes through their broken roofs with its pure eyes, 
and like grass and red poppies.  I love to sit on broken churches’” (227-228). 
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         When there is no God, divinity can be translated back into man, and his creative 
outpourings become the ultimate testament of what he is capable of accomplishing.  God made 
man in his image and likeness but, in this version of the story, the roles are reversed.   
In “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche writes of the Greeks divvying 
up the heavens and placing there “conceptual gods” residing “within their own sphere.”  “Here 
one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling an 
infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running 
water” (4).  Nietzsche acknowledges here the human tendency to try to fix in place a moving 
thing, or, in this case, the tendency to place a rigid set of doctrines atop a perpetual motion, the 
world.  Nietzsche calls for a “reckless amoral artist God” because art is something that 
acknowledges and celebrates change.  He calls for art as a “mobile army of metaphors,” a 
truthfulness that celebrates the world as a thing that changes, transfigures, ripens, diverges. 
Section Five: On Language, Truth, and the Poet 
Why is the question to truth so relevant to the death of God?  Jaspers gives this 
explanation, calling on a passage from The Gay Science: “Belief in the truth was simply a 
consequence of the belief ‘God is the truth and the truth is divine…  But what if precisely this 
becomes increasingly incredible and nothing any longer proves to be divine except error and 
blindness and lies—when God himself proves to be only our most persistent lie?’” (214).  In an 
time of disbelief, there is a real question of whether truth is any longer a tenable way to measure 
the merit of a thing.  And there is indeed a question of whether untruth, or uncertainty is of more 
worth to humanity.  Nietzsche’s relationship to truth, which is complicated by many twists and 
turns through the progression of his philosophic canon, is a crucial component to his advocacy 
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(and sometimes disavowal) of art after the death of God.  As Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good 
and Evil, “...know that no philosopher so far has been proved right and that there might be a 
more laudable truthfulness in every little question mark that you place after your special words 
and favorite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn gestures and 
trumps before accusers law courts” (25).  Throughout his work, Nietzsche is skeptical of 
philosophers before him who presume a kind of certainty about the nature of reality and truth, 
charging them with a fearfulness of the unknown.  Nietzsche himself revels in the anxiety of the 
question mark, referencing some higher truth in uncertainty.  Nietzsche at the same time 
renounces truthfulness as indecent and regressive, while praising a “more laudable truthfulness,” 
a seemingly contradictory stance, to proclaim a greater depth of truth in untruth.  Nietzsche’s 
argumentative lines are purposefully irresolute and subject to constant vacillation for the greater 
purpose of his indirect philosophical discourse, as he attempts to write that which—in his view—
language cannot communicate. 
In all corners of his philosophy, the stances Nietzsche takes are ever-changing and 
purposefully performative.  His philosophic method is partially a way to fight against 
perspectiveless seeing, the kind of sight embodied by a god.  Therefore he must not allow 
statements to stand without reevaluation.  As Jaspers writes:  
His thoughts about truth, since they deny what it required for their formulation, must run 
into incessant contradictions.  Such thoughts would be nothing more than a nonsensical 
confusion, did they not enable us to experience limits that can be revealed only indirectly.  
When the concepts which his theory of truth generates attain these limits, we experience 
the fulfillment of a kind of thinking that unavoidably uses even contradictions as indirect 
indicators (190).  
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This quality in Nietzsche’s writing at the same time makes him very difficult to interpret, and 
also effectively communicates a below-the-surface skepticism about the merits of truth itself, or 
at least the truthfulness of which one can speak.  Because it is not possible, in Nietzsche’s view, 
to achieve an absolute, unmediated transference of truth through language, it is necessary to 
approach from different sides, grasping at the thing indirectly.   
It is in his philosophy of depth and in his mottled relationship to the truth that Nietzsche 
can be related most to some of the fundamental facets of Taoism.  “The Tao that can be spoken is 
not the eternal Tao,” writes Laozi in the Tao Te Ching, meaning that the essence of the Tao is 
something that exists decisively outside of language (1).  This is something that Nietzsche 
struggles against in his own philosophy.  He is fighting to write something that cannot be written, 
that can only be hinted at through an indirect form of communication.  From this springs many of 
the unique qualities of Nietzsche’s philosophic composition, his use of depth, veil, secrecy, 
metaphor, and in some cases, lies, in order to elucidate his complex stance on the merits of truth.   
 Nietzsche’s philosophy is one of depth, a philosophy that calls upon only those with the 
ears to hear, those capable to reading beneath its enchanting languages of surfaces.  His 
philosophy can indeed be palliative and supply aesthetic satisfaction for those who read him at 
all depths, but Nietzsche is fostering some sort of secret group of higher men, of “good 
Europeans” as he calls them in Beyond Good and Evil.  Nietzsche is a philosopher who would 
prefer not to be understood, because for him, there is great value to the void of understanding, to 
holding one’s tongue, in keeping secret (The Gay Science 381).   
 Nietzsche’s difficulty with language is that it must necessarily lie.  It is inefficient in that 
it is trying to put boundaries on an ever-moving, amorphous thing.  Despite its weakness, 
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language is the only way to communicate.  In section 93 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes 
that he is ashamed of his own need to write, but that he must because he knows no other method 
to rid himself of his thoughts.  And, at the end of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche shares a 
lament that his thoughts, once beautiful, must inevitably be weakened as they become words, 
truths: 
Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts!  It was not long ago 
that you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret 
spices—you made me sneeze and laugh—and now?  You have already taken off 
your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already 
look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull!” (237). 
What we call truths are merely metaphors that have lost their potency and have come to be 
accepted as real.  Nietzsche here does acknowledge this supreme type of beauty to his thoughts, 
as they are in their “morning,” but knows that their integrity will be crushed immediately once 
they are released into the world.  They will become hard, uncaring fixtures, perspectiveless and 
dull, “pathetically decent.”  Nietzsche uses the word ‘decent’ elsewhere when he writes about the 
truth in The Gay Science: 
No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to ‘truth at any price,’ this youthful madness 
in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us: for that we are too experienced, 
too serious, too merry, too burned, too profound.  We no longer believe that truth 
remains truth when the veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much to believe 
this.  Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything 
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naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and  ‘know’ everything 
(38). 
It is interesting that Nietzsche speaks of the desire for truth here not as a matter of right or 
wrong, but as a matter of decency.  He aestheticizes it, proclaiming that this will to truth is in bad 
taste, poor form.  The veil and the mystery and the enchantment of the world are very much a 
necessity for Nietzsche.  Even something like reality itself is deeply perspectival.  One of 
Nietzsche’s methods philosophically is to take something serious, something taken as truth, and 
aestheticize it, or make it a matter of preference.  Take, for example, the way Zarathustra speaks 
to his men about a rite of sacrifice, purposefully undercutting the biblical: “But man does not live 
by bread alone, but also of the meat of good lambs, of which I have two.  These should be 
slaughtered quickly and prepared tastily with sage.  I love it that way” (285).  Here is Nietzsche’s 
tastefully playful brand of hedonism, quoting an iconic biblical passage, then immediately 
throwing it to humorous subjectivity.   
To return to the final passage of Beyond Good and Evil, “my written and painted 
thoughts,” it seems a strange, at the end of a text that purports to point toward a philosophy of 
the future, to issue a lament about the weakness of his own words, of their communicative 
ability.   
But, of course, Nietzsche is not to be believed based only upon his surface philosophy.  
He is playing a definite game of irony here, undercutting his sentiment with rich metaphor.  
Nietzsche writes about the sorrow when words come to be captured, painted, molded, 
transformed, like tired birds caught by hand.  He expresses sorrow that his words can never 
adequately express their origin in his mind.  Yet this grievance comes in the form of a striking 
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passage that is written precisely to illustrate the profound power of words, to incite an animated 
response at his exquisite use of metaphor.  Simply that it is written down, by an author who 
openly values the silence of the hermit who never betrays his concealed philosophy through 
language, is what calls all of this into question, into irony.  Nietzsche, merely by writing all of 
this down, proves that he is at least struggling with this notion that the best way to stay profound 
is to keep silent.  He writes in Book Two of The Gay Science that “Every choice human being 
strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy…” and calls for a “burial in silence”  (37, 51).  
But Nietzsche, as evidenced by his prolific career, could not keep silent; this was something that 
he alternately rejoiced and bemoaned.   
Nietzsche looks toward the citadel, the tower, because it would be perhaps easier, but if 
Nietzsche valued so much this kind of silence he would not belabor himself to speak out at all.  
No, Nietzsche seems to call for a kind of silence within a masked, multiflorous, and highly 
perspectival speech.  When Nietzsche writes in praise of silence, it might be read as a warning 
against the danger of being ‘understood,’ being dogmatized and made to stand still.  He writes in 
another place that, “Corruption is merely a nasty word for the autumn of a people” (The Gay 
Science sec. 23).  What is really ‘nasty,’ for Nietzsche, is the overtaking and ugly need of 
humanity to maintain stasis, their fright over change. Nietzsche is perhaps unsure about his 
project at the end of Beyond Good and Evil, but he has no qualms about painting question marks 
at the end of his texts.   
The weight of Nietzsche’s writing purposefully speaks to something more profound than 
his dissatisfaction with the pull of language and he does everything he can to ensure that his 
philosophy does not transform itself into the very kind of project for truth that he warns against.  
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So he questions himself constantly, contradicts everything he has said, and has it out for every 
other philosopher who assumes truth, who deign to speak the nature of reality.  
 
 
 
  
 25 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Wallace Stevens: The Man with the Supreme Fiction 
Chapter Introduction 
 This second chapter will address Stevens’ letters, essays, and lectures in an effort to 
better discern his conception of God’s death and the role of the poet in a disenchanted 
civilization.  The chapter will culminate in Stevens’ own philosophic reimagining of the world 
through a mode of enchantment he called the supreme fiction.   
Section One: Stevens and Philosophy 
I am very much interested in your preoccupation with Nietzsche.  In his mind one 
does not see the world more clearly; both of us must often have felt how a strong 
mind distorts the world.  Nietzsche’s mind was a perfect example of that sort of 
thing.  Perhaps his effect was merely the effect of the epatant.  The incessant job 
is to get into focus, not out of focus.  Nietzsche is as perfect a means of getting out 
of focus as a little bit too much to drink (Letters 431-432). 
Nietzsche was by no means a commonplace character in the writings of Wallace Stevens, 
but his influence likely extended much further than Stevens would ever admit.  When Stevens 
did refer to Nietzsche, he had a comic and rather curious penchant for comparing the self 
proclaimed hermit of Sils Maria to various alcoholic beverages.  In addition to connecting his 
effect to that of drunkenness, Stevens wrote letters also in which he referred to Nietzsche as the 
“Biermensch” and imagined Zarathustra enjoying a tasteful cocktail: 
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It is finished, Zarathustra says; and one goes to the Canoe Club
1
 and has a couple 
of Martinis and a pork chop and looks down the spaces of the river and 
participates in the disintegration, the decomposition, the rapt finale.  Murder...and 
adieu; assassination...and farewell (Letters 622). 
This is a letter Stevens wrote to Jose Rodriguez Feo, a young Cuban scholar and regular 
correspondent, but most of the allusions to Nietzsche in the gigantic volume, Letters of Wallace 
Stevens, come out of the collection of correspondences between Stevens and Henry Church.  
Church was a close friend of Stevens and great admirer of Nietzsche who brought him up 
frequently in his letters, provoking several bizarre and diverting responses from his friend.  In his 
book, Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext, B.J. Leggett looks closely at Stevens’ 
correspondences, pulling up several letters from the Huntington College Archives unpublished in 
the Letters.  Much chatter between the two--Stevens and Church--relates to their trials, failures, 
and successes in procuring specific volumes of Nietzsche’s work in German.   Peppered 
throughout are fervent attempts from Church to get Stevens to admit an appreciation of 
Nietzsche, and Stevens’ tone of disinterested incredulity at Church’s appreciation of the man’s 
philosophy.  In one 1944 letter, for instance, he writes, “...I read only the first volume of Human, 
all Too Human, and didn’t think a great deal of that: not nearly what you thought” (Leggett 39).  
In another letter, Church enlists the help of Stevens to interpret aphorism 34 from Beyond Good 
and Evil, which posits some conception of the fictiveness of the world.  Stevens responds, 
offering up an interpretation of the passage, then drawing comparison between it and  
Stevens was a prolific letter writer of a quite uncommon disposition: it was not unusual 
for Stevens to assemble artful and capacious responses to inquiries about his own writing, 
                                                 
1
 It is of interest to note that this is the same club where Stevens himself ate lunch every 
Wednesday (Nichols) 
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frequently composing letters that both clarified and complicated his work; the universe of 
Stevens’ exuberant correspondences is at once delightful and mystifying.  “That Nietzsche’s 
texts are in some manner absorbed into many of Stevens’ may have first been recognized by 
Stevens himself, or at least the Stevens who is the many-sided persona of Letters of Wallace 
Stevens,” writes Leggett (32).  And Milton J. Bates writes of the letters persona and beyond, 
“Stevens both discouraged and invited comparison with Nietzsche during his lifetime” (“Major 
Man…” 812).  The fact remains, however, that for an insurance executive-poet who claimed to 
have had not much interest or understanding of philosophy, Stevens shows a remarkable 
proclivity for philosophic thinking in his poems, essays, lectures, even in his letters. 
With respect to the letters, when Leggett writes that “Stevens’ letters on Nietzsche reveal 
in their gaps and contradictions evidence of evasion and suppression…” I am inclined to believe 
him.  For a poet whose work is undeniably philosophical and shares almost uncanny similarities 
with Nietzschean formulations of truth, the ubermensch, the death of God, eternal return, the 
three metamorphoses, and others, Stevens’ protestations of influence and even animosity toward 
Nietzsche and philosophers calls attention to itself.  Bart Eeckhout in his essay, “Stevens and 
Philosophy,” makes an argument that Stevens’ own pushback against philosophy is in itself 
telling: 
For one thing, Stevens was not quite consistent in his attacks on philosophy and 
its practitioners.  For another, the urge he felt to set off his own writings from 
those of philosophers already betrays a number of shared concerns and interests.  
Most poets, after all, are not much inclined to dwell on the topic of how their 
poetry relates to philosophy; they simply take this to be a non-issue (Cambridge 
103). 
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Leggett takes a similar line of argument, positing that we might read Stevens’ insistence that his 
work is not impacted by Nietzsche--especially when it is him and not his interlocutor who brings 
Nietzsche into the conversation--as a tacit admittance of Nietzschean influence.  Leggett’s 
reading of the Nietzschean allusions and shadows calls upon work from both critics Harold 
Bloom and Milton J. Bates to clarify and set aside his claims.  He also makes clever to Freud’s 
notion of denial in relation to a letter in which Stevens responds to Jose Rodriguez Feo’s 
question, “Excuse my ignorance: who are the major men so consistently present in your last 
poems?” (Leggett 45).  Stevens responds rather defensively, insisting that the major men in his 
poems are not “Nietzschean shadows,” an interpretation which was not even brought forward by 
Feo.  Calling on Freud’s essay, “Negation,” Leggett writes, “When patients voluntarily bring 
forward certain associations in a negative form, as in Freud’s example of the man who says of 
one of the people in his dream, ‘It’s not my mother,’ we may amend the response to: ‘So it is his 
mother’” (45).  
Some of Stevens’ push-back against insinuations of Nietzschean influence, as well as 
against influence from other writers can be read an extension of the very natural concern of a 
poet, of any thinker, over the prospect oweing their voice entirely to someone preceding them.  It 
is a concept expounded by Harold Bloom in his book, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of 
Poetry.  Leggett’s book, on the whole, seeks to provide a thorough reading of Stevens’ early 
poetry as deeply philosophical and deeply influenced by Nietzsche, despite Stevens’ own 
protestations, despite his insistence, as he cites in one letter to Church, that he has only a dim 
memory of Nietzsche from boyhood, or his aphoristic proclamation in Adagia, “Perhaps it is of 
more value to infuriate philosophers than to get along with them (Letters 409; CPP 906).  
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Leggett sums up his justification for comparing the two in the introduction to his Early Stevens 
book: 
According to the perspective we adopt, we may says that Stevens is a Nietzschean 
poet because he exemplifies qualities we associate with Nietzsche, because he has 
been a frequent subject of critics who are themselves influenced by Nietzsche’s 
theories of language, because his poetry may be glossed usefully with passages 
from Nietzsche, because his concepts, ideas, tropes parallel Nietzsche’s in striking 
ways, because certain of his assumptions, values, themes, images have their 
source in Nietzsche, because his concepts and figures are generally identified with 
Nietzsche even if Stevens acquired them elsewhere--there are presumably a 
number of other possible combinations and nuances (18-19). 
It is true that there are some remarkable and quite uncanny similarities with Nietzsche to be 
found in the work Wallace Stevens, but it is not my endgame, my objective, to argue for a 
Nietzschean reading of Wallace Stevens, or to insist that Stevens is a poet whose can be 
somehow encapsulated by the term, Nietzschean.  That is Leggett’s aim in his book, and he does-
-to my mind--a thoroughly fair, convincing, and comprehensive job of it.  But I do not find that 
line of argument very provocative and further, I think that there are some purposeful statements 
in both Stevens’ prose and poetry indicating his very intentional self-separation from Nietzsche 
and from the world of philosophy, such as in “Adagia,” when he indicates, “The poet must not 
adapt his experience to that of the philosopher” (CPP 909).  Or when he writes in his essay, “The 
Figure of Youth as a Virile Poet,” “The philosopher proves that the philosopher exists.  The poet 
merely enjoys existence...the poet says that...la vie est plus belle que les idees” (CPP 677-678).  
As with Nietzsche, is crucial to move beyond the surface with Stevens, to move beyond his 
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criticism of philosophy and of Nietzsche, recognizing a deeper level of connection that is both 
inherent and directly indicated by Stevens himself.  In Stevens’ own words, “...no one is needed 
to tell us that poetry and philosophy are akin” (CPP 661).  And certainly, some connections, as 
in the letters, have to be dug out through intuition and analysis.  But, it is also crucial to take into 
account Stevens’ own conception of his end task as necessarily poetic, but of a poetics that finds 
much of its foundations in philosophy.  As he writes in a letter to Henry Church, “There is no 
reason why any poet should not have the status of the philosopher, nor why his poetry should not 
give up to the keenest minds and most searching spirits something of what philosophy gives up 
and, in addition, the peculiar things that only poetry can give” (Letters 292).  Philosophy is that 
standard by which Stevens chooses to measure the rightful merit of the poet.  He also charges 
poetry with similar goals to philosophy and as providing some similar satisfaction.  But poetry, 
for Stevens, is a moving beyond philosophy.  It is a moving beyond thinking and overthinking 
into sensing and feeling.  It is, as I imagine Stevens would see it, a gathering and a culmination 
of philosophical ideas into an aesthetic order.  This has much to do with Stevens’ notion of the  
“status of the poet in a disturbed society” and the nature of poetic truth, which I will come to 
later (Letters 292).  
 But, doubtless, Stevens’ most philosophic flirtation in both his prose and poetry is his 
career-long interaction with Nietzsche’s death of God.  Stevens clarifies it, expounds upon it, 
even builds an entire poetic theory atop this Nietzschean model.  J. Hillis Miller, in his book, 
Poets of Reality, examines six authors to trace the movement of a twentieth century poetics. Of 
Stevens, one of the six, he writes, “From one end of his work to the other he reiterates a single 
idea, and all his work is an attempt to explore the endlessly variable perspectives from which 
reality can be viewed by the imagination.  He is resolutely carrying out Nietzsche’s injunction 
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that man the survivor of God should experiment tirelessly with new truths, new representations, 
new life forms” (Miller Poets of Reality 225).  From this angle, Stevens’ aims take on an 
unmistakably Nietzschean mood.  Stevens is a poet writing in Nietzsche’s wake, contending with 
the various problems that the death of God brings into a culture and into a body of poetry.   
Section Two: Poetry and the Death of God 
My trouble, and the trouble of a great many people, is the loss of belief in the sort 
of God in Whom we were all brought up to believe (Stevens, Letters 348). 
Nietzsche leads the wide-eyed, contemptuous crusade of the godless, skeptical of all that 
is mild and faith-filled. While Stevens accepts and carries on the Nietzschean dictum, “God is 
dead,” he avoids the typically Nietzschean tone of disdain toward religion and toward the 
religious, instead electing to exhibit a strong sense of nostalgia at an event after which humanity 
can never be quite the same, treating the event as “...a dissolution which happens as naturally and 
irrevocably as the falling of leaves in autumn” (Miller Poets of Reality 221).  For Stevens, as for 
Nietzsche, the death of God does make room for something new and fictive, something light, 
cunning, masterly, and artful.  And, in this aspect, Stevens recognizes a necessity, even a 
pleasure, in the freedom that a retired deity leaves to the inventive order of man.  Yet, with 
Stevens, there is also a bit of nostalgia for that great and “benign illusion” called religion 
(Stevens Letters 402).  He writes in a letter, “The major poetic idea in the world is and always 
has been the idea of God” (Letters 378).  This sounds like the Nietzsche in The Gay Science 
section ___, who recognizes the undeniably utilitarian origins of art, the purpose of which was 
always to assist humanity in its connection with the divine.  But, unlike Nietzsche, Stevens is not 
bothered by the abiding and profound interlacing of poetry and theology.  For Stevens, the gods 
were not the symptom of human sickness, of a world that had lost its health.  Unlike Nietzsche, 
 32 
 
he found very little fault in religion.  The problem was not that Christianity was indicative of 
something deeply awry or unhealthy in society, but that it had become obsolete: “Christianity is 
exhausted culture,” he writes in Adagia (914).  Though Stevens certainly recognizes the 
necessary end to an exhausted religious age, he speaks of the gods and of their time with in a 
tone tinged with pride, emphasizing the lucidity of that great era when fictive gods ruled the 
earth and emphasizing with reverence the somber and wreckful event of their downfall. 
In the lecture, “Two or Three Ideas,” from the collection, The Necessary Angel, Stevens 
engages deeply with his own perception of God’s death and with the consequences it brings into 
the world of poetry.  He states, “To speak of the origin and end of gods is not a light matter.  It is 
to speak of the origin and end of eras of human belief...the gods were personae of a peremptory 
elevation and glory.  It would be wrong to look back at them as if they had existed in some 
indigence of the spirit.  They were, in fact, as we see them now, the clear giants of a vivid time.  
The kind of moving on of which Stevens participates holds no contempt for that which came 
before it, but is nonetheless a thorough and outright lunge forward.   
For Stevens, “the death of one god is the death of all,” (or, “What is true of one 
metaphysical term is true of all”) and this death catalyzes a very honest check with reality, a 
standoff between man and a world now unfilled, desolate, and shadowless. (CPP 905, 727).  
Miller summarizes this mood after God’s death as a fundamental theme in the poetry and prose 
of Stevens, writing, “This vanishing of the gods, leaving a barren man in a barren land, is the 
basis of all Stevens’ thought and poetry.  His version of the death of the gods coincides with a 
radical transformation in the way man sees the world.  What had been a warm home takes on a 
look of hardness and emptiness, like the walls, floors, and banisters of a vacant house” (Miller 
Poets of Reality 219).  And Stevens does indeed make that same comparison himself, using the 
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absent gods to draw a parallel between empty heaven an abandoned house.   He announces, “It 
was their annihilation, not ours, and yet it left us feeling that in a measure we, too, had been 
annihilated.  It left us feeling dispossessed and alone in a solitude, like children without parents, 
in a home that seemed deserted, in which the amicable rooms and halls had taken on a look of 
hardness and emptiness” (CPP 842).  The sentiment and symbolism of this passage both so 
perfectly express the kind of trial that Stevens is trying to emphasize in the lecture, “Two or 
Three Ideas.”  Even for the non-believer, God existed as one of the greatest and most adamant 
stories ever told.  The tales and traditions of the world built around faith were products of an 
enormously uplifting imagination, a cosmic illusion “produced on the highest level of the 
cognitive” (Stevens Letters 50).   In the project of God-building, humanity’s ingenuity and 
imagination pushed far beyond the celestial possible.   
“The people, not the priests, made the gods,” writes Stevens (CPP 843).  Stevens spoke 
of the gods as colossal figures of the human imagination, figures created by humans, in the 
likeness of humans: “...all gods are created in the images of their creators” (CPP 846).  The gods, 
in the rich world of Stevens’ poetry and prose, are projections of human ideals and desires.  This 
idea calls to mind German theorist, Ludwig Freuerbach and his book, The Essence of 
Christianity, in which he speaks of “the true anthropological essence of religion” and argues that 
“the personality of God is nothing else than the projected personality of man” (288).  Theology, 
by this characterization first put forth by Feuerbach and backed by Stevens, is really a kind of 
anthropology that is not yet aware of its earthly origins, making religion the projection of human 
nature outward upon a constructed heaven.  This idea translates to Stevens poetry as well.  In his 
masterwork, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” Stevens proclaims that the biblical Eve 
“...made the air the mirror of herself,/ Of her sons and of her daughters.  They found themselves/ 
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In heaven as in a glass; a second earth,” implying that they projected themselves, their own 
image and likeness, onto a heaven which mirrors the earth (CPP 331).  And in another poem, 
“Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery,” Stevens calls upon the “God of the sausage-makers,” 
naming him “...the merest patron saint/ Ennobled as in a mirror to sanctity” (CPP 127).  Here is 
the same language of mirrors to suggest that, maybe, the “God of the sausage-makers” is a 
projected patron for the sausage-makers on earth.  When understood from this angle, faith in God 
is actually a disguised faith in humanity.  And when God ceases to mediate this exchange, when 
he falls away, the immense power of human agency and creativity can finally come to light. 
Faith in God was not a sign of human exhaustion or infantilism, but was, in fact, a great 
feat of human inventiveness and gumption.  No wonder that, when God, as he existed in the 
imagination, disappeared from the world, humankind is stricken quite unexpectedly by an intense 
consciousness of its abandonment.  Stevens chooses, aptly, to adopt the typical metaphor of 
humans as the children of God, equating his absence in feeling to that of a parent leaving their 
child alone in an empty house, the house that was once the house of God.  Churches stand, in 
fact, as the visible symbols of something very real what once touched our lives but which no 
longer breathe the same glory.  
 In Stevens’ version of God’s death, or at least the version presented in “Two or Three 
Ideas,” the event is sudden, mid-sentence even.  The death of God is an all-at-once, abrupt act of 
vanishing: 
To see the gods dispelled in mid-air and dissolve like clouds is one of the great 
human experiences...It is simply that they came to nothing...What was most 
extraordinary is that they left no mementoes behind, no thrones, no mystic rings, 
no texts either of the soil or of the soul.  It was as if they had never inhabited the 
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earth.  There was no crying out for their return.  They were not forgotten because 
they had been a part of the glory of the earth.  At the same time, no man ever 
muttered a petition in his heart for the restoration of those unreal shapes” (CPP 
842). 
And, suddenly, humanity is alone.  In the Nietzschean tradition, God leaves in his wake an 
enormous shadow that, strikingly, is nearly absent in Stevens’ version of the tale.  While 
Nietzsche suspects that it will take thousands of years to root the vestiges of divinity out from 
our culture, Stevens seems surprised at how quickly and unceremoniously God has vanished, and 
describes a humanity that does not call out for a great return.  Nietzsche’s philosophy is full of 
admonition a a culture he views as clinging on the coattails of a sickly and retreating deity.  But 
in Stevens, “The is no rich echo of nuance and meaning from the poetic tradition as in Eliot or 
Yeats.  God is dead, and with him died the heaven of consecrated symbols coming down through 
the Christian or Platonic ages.  Stevens’ earth is flat and bare, and a bowl of flowers is just a 
bowl of flowers” (Miller Poets of Reality 230-231).  With Nietzsche, there is a long process 
through which humanity, a little at a time, comes to see the world in its irrefutable barrenness.  In 
Stevens, though, it seems that humanity is quite suddenly endowed with that knowledge; he does 
not partake in the Nietzschean story that the gods perished after a long, slow illness, and instead 
describes the gods as, one day, just slipping away.  Miller, here, also disassociates Stevens from 
other modernist poetic traditions, likely drawing allusion to “Burnt Norton,” the first part of T.S. 
Eliot’s grand philosophical poem, “Four Quartets,” in which Eliot alludes to “a bowl of rose-
leaves” as a metaphoric impetus for the movement of the whole poem.  Stevens, Miller asserts, is 
writing his poetry upon a blank slate, upon a world that certainly has memory of God, but that is 
unhallowed by his specter.   
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As in Nietzsche, the death of God creates conditions in Stevens’ world that are unlivable.  In 
other words, before the opportunity arises to celebrate God’s death and the creation it makes 
possible, there is a necessity to quell a kind of chaos that arises when humanity is loosed from it 
godly tether. 
In the frenzied words of the madman, “‘Whither are we moving?  Away from all suns? 
Are we not plunging continually?  Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions?  Is there still 
any up or down?’” (Nietzsche The Gay Science 181).  And as Stevens writes in his poem, “Sad 
Strains of a Gay Waltz,” “There is order in neither sea nor sun…There are these sudden mobs of 
men,/ These sudden clouds of faces and arms..” (Collected Poetry & Prose 100).  Stevens calls 
these mobs “An immense suppression freed,” but writes that they are helpless, crying out for 
something they cannot describe, for “order beyond their speech.”  Both Nietzsche and Stevens 
keenly recognized the problems inherent in God’s death.  They felt the acute loss of God, the 
ordering force, the mechanism of defense against solitude and purposelessness.  For Stevens, 
God was one of those benevolent lies, however grand, humanity had told itself about the world.  
For Nietzsche, the idea of a God is treacherous, sickly, and anything but benevolent.  What both 
agreed upon, however, is that the departure of God created an absence, an enormous void of 
belief that needed to be filled, and that the artist, the man who seeks language on a higher plane, 
has a unique ability to alleviate the pain of abandonment..  Stevens writes, “...in an age of 
disbelief, when the gods have come to an end, when we think of them as the aesthetic projections 
of a time that has passed, men turn to a fundamental glory of their own and from that create a 
style of bearing themselves in reality.  They create a new style of bearing in a new reality” (CPP 
844).  To define this new style of bearing, he turns to art, specifically poetry, to investigate its 
role in a godless society. 
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Section Three: The Purpose of Poetry & the Role of the Poet 
The poetry that created the idea of God will either adapt it to our different 
intelligence, or create a substitute for it, or make it unnecessary (Stevens Letters 
378). 
The death of God, the most major and abiding poetic ideal, brings into poetry a 
vacuousness, and heaps a new responsibility onto the poet.  The poet is charged, ultimately, with 
the creation of new values, with the task of ordering and imbuing old words full of new faith, so 
that the “mobs of men,” to whom Stevens alludes in “Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz,” can go on 
living.  “The role of the poet is to help people to live their lives,” writes Stevens (CPP 661).  
And of poetry itself, he writes, “The purpose of poetry is to contribute to man’s happiness” (CPP 
908).  The death of God leaves the world, as Stevens sometimes sees it, disenchanted and even 
hostile, shadowless, and the poet has the unique capability to reintroduce to the world the 
mysteries and illusions it once held.  Stevens writes in a letter to arts patron, Hi Simons, “If one 
no longer believes in God (as truth), it is not possible merely to disbelieve; it becomes necessary 
to believe in something else” (Letters 370).  The role of the poet, then, is to add to life that 
necessary drop of fantasy, illusory faith, which is the only kind of belief, in Stevens’ view, that 
can any longer hold a modern society.
2
  In another letter, he writes, “I said that I thought that we 
had reached a point at which we could no longer really believe in anything unless we recognized 
that it was a fiction” (Letters 430).  This is the very kind of fiction that the poet can supply, “in 
                                                 
2
 The poet also has the task of protection.  Stevens writes in Adagia, “The poet represents the 
mind in its act of defending us against itself,” calling to mind the role of the Freudian watchman 
over the unconscious mind, who protects the sensibilities of consciousness from certain kinds of 
knowledge deemed too much for it (CPP 911).  It evokes, also, comparisons with Nietzsche’s 
Geneaology of Morals, in which he uses the metaphor of digestion to explain the necessity of 
forgetting and of separation of the conscious mind from the unconscious mind.  Here, too, in 
Stevens, there is a sense that there are certain details, such as the overwhelming quality of a 
godless world, that the poet can help man to forget. 
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his measure and in his style” (CPP 780).  The poet gives to humankind “that for which it was 
searching in itself and in the life around it and which it had not yet quite found,” a certain order, 
which “means peace” (Stevens CPP 661;  Letters 293).   
Stevens repeatedly emphasizes that this is an exceptional skill the poet has to instill 
reality with greater significance, and that the role and status of the poet is of “paramount” 
importance (CPP 660). Stevens writes, in “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words,” on the 
priority and beauty of poetry in everyday life: 
The deepening need for words to express our thoughts and feelings which, we are 
sure, are all the truth that we shall ever experience, having no illusions, makes us 
listen to words when we hear them, loving them and feeling them, makes us 
search the sound of them, for a finality, a perfection, an unalterable vibration, 
which it is only within the power of the acutest poet to give them (CPP 662). 
Stevens intentionally stresses the crucial power within the grasp only of the poet to provide 
certain kinds of basic and indispensable satisfactions to a society.  With the death of God, the 
most critical essence of value and understanding, the role of the poet takes on a greater 
significance as humanity searches its language for the most orderly and coherent strain of words, 
and also for something uncanny, mysterious, and imbedded with enigmatic significances.  
Stevens writes, “...what makes the poet the potent figure that he is, or was, or ought to be, is that 
he creates the world to which we turn incessantly and without knowing it and that he gives to life 
the supreme fictions without which we  are unable to conceive of it” (CPP 662).  Here, Stevens 
hints at his philosophic conception of a transcendent order of poetry called the supreme fiction, a 
new belief in language that only the poet can supply. 
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Stevens’ rich conception of poetry confers a certain kind of dignity unto the poet, a 
superiority that had not formerly been granted him.  “There is no element so conspicuously 
absent from contemporary poetry than nobility,” he writes in “The Noble Rider and the Sound of 
Words” (CPP 664).  Stevens, in calling for the elevated value of poetry, echoes the sentiment of 
19th century cultural theorist, Matthew Arnold, who writes similarly in his 1895 essay, “The 
Study of Poetry”: 
We should conceive of poetry worthily, and more highly than it has been the 
custom to conceive of it.  We should conceive of it as capable of higher uses, and 
called to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it 
hitherto.  More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to 
interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us (Arnold 2). 
Stevens is deeply engaged with this task of heightening the status of the contemporary poet, 
likening his deserved nobility not only to that of philosophy and philosophers, but also to the 
figures of the divine.  Stevens asserts, in a 1940 letter to Henry Church,  “The figures of the 
essential poets should be spiritual figures” (Letters 378).  Further, Stevens identifies his task in 
the lecture “Two or Three Ideas,” as “to elevate the poem to the level of one of the major 
significances of life and to equate it...with gods and men” (CPP 845).  Poetry itself, in the work 
of Stevens, accrues an unprecedented yearning and appreciation.  Helen Vendler, in her book, 
Wallace Stevens: Words Chosen out of Desire, has high praise for the poet: “Never was there a 
more devout believer—in love, in the transcendent, in truth, in poetry—than Stevens” (41).  A 
great deal of Stevens’ writing, both the prose and the verse, turn inward upon poetry itself, 
theorizing, elevating, conferring praise and importance.  Stevens sees his own task as a spiritual 
one. He says, “I want to try to formulate a conception of perfection in poetry with reference to 
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the present time and the near future and to speculate on the activities possible to it as it develops 
itself throughout the lives of men and women.  I think of it as a role of the utmost seriousness.  It 
is, for one thing, a spiritual role” (CPP 842).  There is a deep sense, in Stevens’ work, that the 
act of poetizing and theologizing are deeply intertwined and, in some senses, are simply 
extensions of one another.  The project of the poet is a generative and fundamentally theological 
project of creating new values. 
 Thought he insisted on the nobility and singularity of the poet, even asserting, “There is 
not a poet whom we prize today that does not address himself to an elite,” Stevens’ notion of 
nobility differs immensely from Nietzsche’s idea of higher men (CPP 661).  Stevens, like 
Nietzsche, did describe an overman-like figure in his notion of the noble poet.  Bates, in his 
essay, “Major Man and Overman: Wallace Stevens’ Use of Nietzsche,” argues for a comparison 
that Stevens himself contested (twice, in Letters), but that I think is undeniable, between 
Stevens’ conception of the hero and his “major man,” and Nietzsche’s ubermensch.  Bates writes 
of Stevens’ work that it “records his lifelong effort to suspend disbelief in a significant, if old-
fashioned, value--the heroic ideal” (Bates “Major Man” 811).  Stevens writes to Henry Church, 
“What is terribly lacking from life today is the well developed individual, the master of life, or 
the man who by his mere appearance convinces you that a mastery of life is possible” (Letters 
518).  Stevens indeed searches for some higher order of man, a “master of life,” and makes the 
poet into a redemptive, heroic, spiritual figure who is alone capable of giving to society what it 
needs.  But it is precisely in Stevens’ purpose for poetry and of the poet, where he differs 
decisively from Nietzsche, whose hero is engaged in a much more isolated process of ‘going 
over.’  Stevens’ poet, his “noble rider,” is given the purpose, “to help people to live their lives,” 
 41 
 
to defend, and to “contribute to man’s happiness” (CPP 661, 908).  Bates clarifies this 
distinction: 
Stevens was far more tolerant that Nietzsche of the general run of humanity.  
Thought he clothed his hero in the imagery of sun and mountains and ice, he also 
insisted that major man be grounded in the common man and not exceed him by 
too much.  Whereas Nietzsche had considered the study of ‘average man’ the 
most disagreeable of the philosopher’s duties, Stevens admonishes the apprentice 
of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ not to neglect the most pathetic and 
disoriented minim of humanity in composing the heroic ideal” (“Major Man” 
837).   
Bates refers to the final section of “It Must Be Abstract,” in which Stevens describes a tramp-like 
figure, a Vladimir or Estragon in his “old coat,/ His slouching pantaloons” (CPP 336).  He writes 
that this figure is “Looking for what was, where it used to be,” like the voices crying out for 
order in “Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz.”  Stevens addresses his apprentice, saying, “It is of him, 
ephebe, to make, to confect/ The final elegance, not to console/ Nor sanctify, but plainly to 
propound.”  It is of this figure, “pathetic and disoriented,” that the poem springs.  He is the 
impetus for the poem, and it is for the poet to take him, as he is, and to raise him up.  As opposed 
to Nietzsche’s hero, who enlists a small elite to follow him into the mountains, Stevens’ poet is 
indeed noble,--and sometimes depicted also as a mountain-dweller--but also must be “grounded 
in the common man.”  The enchantment that is the task of the poet is not only for an elite, but for 
everyone. 
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Section Four: On Truth, The Imagination, and Reality 
The most provocative of all realities is that reality of which we never lose sight 
but never see solely as it is (CPP 848) 
 Apparent in both Stevens’ poetic and personal life, is a ceaseless commitment to the 
lawless, stormy, yet vital bond between the imagination and reality.  “It gives a man character as 
a poet to have this daily contact with a job,” Stevens told a reporter during a rare interview he 
granted in 1950, emphasizing the vital tether that the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 
provided Stevens to the facts of existence.  (New York Times).  And what could be a better 
embodiment of the tug of war between the imagination and reality than the “surety poet,” who is 
all insurance executive at the office, but who carries to and from work a vivid internal world of 
metaphor (Nichols)?  “I don’t divide my life, [I] just go on living,” says Stevens, affirming the 
necessary truce between two opposing forces.  But, even for the insurance executive-poet, the 
apparent master of dual worlds, this truce does not come easily.  The poet, for Stevens, is the 
figure agilely poised between reality and imagination, who must--in order to provide righteous 
illusions--affirm reality with all that he has.   
In 1951, Stevens accepted an honorary degree from Bard College and gave a short speech 
of which the subject was the relationship of the poet to reality.  In the speech, he asserts, “The 
poet finds that as between these two sources: the imagination and reality, the imagination is 
false, whatever else may be said of it, and reality is true; and being concerned that poetry should 
be a thing of vital and virile importance, he commits himself to reality, which then becomes his 
inescapable and ever-present difficulty and inamorata” (CPP 838).  Stevens speaks of “the way 
of the poet as the way of the truth,” “a way through reality,” and insists upon reality as “the 
ultimate value,” asserting the necessity for the poet to establish his rhetorical inventions upon a 
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basis of truth (CPP 838, 906).  “This decision to commit oneself to reality does not lead to an 
immediate victory,” writes Miller, and quotes from Stevens’ Opus Posthumous, “‘I must impale 
myself on reality’” (Poets of Reality 235).  Stevens portrays this aspect of the poet’s life as 
ladened with a genuine spirit of self-discipline, but vows that the poet’s struggle with his “ever-
present difficulty and inamorata” is not unrecompensed.  “In all his poems with all their 
enchantments for the poet himself, there is the final enchantment that they are true,” says Stevens 
in his Bard College address (CPP 838).   
But truth, for Stevens, as for Nietzsche, is a beast of a most fickle nature.  Stevens 
emphasizes the critical separation between philosophic and poetic truth in “The Figure of Youth 
as a Virile Poet,” contending that philosophic truth is a matter of logic, and that poetic truth is a 
matter of empiricism, or stemming from experience of the senses (CPP 676).
3
  Steven Shaviro 
writes on “Stevens’ logic,” calling it “ repetitive and accretive, not dialectical or progressive,” as 
in traditional philosophy (Shaviro 231).  Poetic truth, “all the truth we shall ever experience,” is 
ingrained in the senses and is deeply perspectival (CPP 662).  Stevens clarifies his definition of 
poetic truth by explaining that “poetic truth is an agreement with reality, brought about by the 
imagination of a man disposed to be strongly influenced by his imagination, which he believes, 
for a time, to be true…” (CPP 676).  Truth in poetry, then, is a momentary agreement with the 
real brought about, seemingly, by a powerful wave of imagination.   
 Stevens shares the Nietzschean attitude that humanity has harbored an unseemly 
overenthusiasm for ‘the truth.’  In “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words,” he writes, “We 
have been a little insane about the truth.  We have had an obsession” (CPP 663).  Stevens favors, 
                                                 
3
 This contrast strikes me as a bit dubious.  By this definition, many of Stevens’ own poems are 
engaged with philosophical truth.  Nonetheless, these clarifications do seem to make some sense, 
and they provide a basic conception for how Stevens sees poetic truth as distinct from 
philosophic truth. 
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rather, a kind of perspectivism, a “willed metamorphosis,” and the reality of which he speaks is 
quite different from the cultural norms (Miller Poets of Reality 235).  “The thing in itself,” is not 
of terrible concern to Stevens.  What is of concern, is the way in way in which the poet genuinely 
portrays reality within the enchanting sphere of the imagination.  Miller expounds upon this view 
of reality: “It is impossible to speak directly of the thing in its barrenness, but a new aspect of the 
thing can be put into words, and therefore reality is never the thing in itself, only some new view 
of it” (Miller Poets of Reality 238).  There is no perspectiveless seeing.  Reality is viewable, but 
only through a necessary imposition from the imagination.  “A poet’s words are of things that do 
not exist without the words,” writes Stevens, meaning that the poet’s words do not simply 
portray reality, but create it (CPP 663).  The poet, as the “orator of the imagination,” is has the 
responsibility of providing palliative illusion in an era of disbelief, but also has the equally--if 
not more--important task of holding a firm grip on reality, only a rethinking of reality in 
accordance to satisfactions only the imagination can supply (CPP 730).  He must provide a fit 
between the mind and the world. 
 
 Stevens writes, “The real is only the base.  But it is the base.”  The imagination is a rich 
world build atop its necessary foundation, reality.  And the poet is charged to “create his unreal 
out of what is real” (CPP 679).  In “Imagination as Value,” Stevens calls the imagination “the 
power of the mind over the possibility of things…” (CPP 726).  The imagination is a gathering 
of substance, of reality, and a directing of creative energies toward an authentic whole.  The 
imagination is a force pressing constantly against reality, the “expression of” which, “the sound 
of its words, helps us to live our lives” (CPP 665).  For Stevens, the poetic process is one he 
calls “psychologically an escapist process” (CPP 661-662).  It is a fictiveness that is part of a 
necessary story one tells about the word to make living in it a bit easier.  These fictions are, as 
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Stevens would say, “benign illusions,” because they are “extensions of reality” (CPP 430).  They 
are believable because they have basis in the real, but they are believable still because they are 
not all real, but rather, are imaginative interpretations of reality. 
Stevens conceived, for a time, that the imagination itself could be his supreme ordering 
force, a remedy to the chaos of godlessness, but recognized that it needed more reachable and 
concrete manifestation, one that poetry provided: 
The idea of pure poetry, essential imagination, as the highest objective of the poet, 
appears to be, at least potentially, as great as the idea of God, and, for that matter, 
greater, if the idea of God is only one of the things of the imagination...Logically, 
I ought to believe in essential imagination, but that has its difficulties.  It is easier 
to believe in a thing created by the imagination.  A good deal of my poetry 
recently has concerned an identity for that thing (Letters 369-370). 
Stevens raises pure poetry up to, and beyond, godliness, proclaiming it as the ultimate value, and 
disclosing that he has been embroiled in a project to define an essential poetry.  This task of 
which he speaks in this letter is that poetic idea which will carry him for the rest of his career, the 
supreme fiction. 
Section Five: The Supreme Fiction 
I said that I thought that we had reached a point at which we could no longer 
really believe in anything unless we recognized that it was a fiction (Letters 430). 
In an era defined by God’s failure to arrive, the poetic mind is tasked with the creation of an 
order, however illusory, however fictive.  With the death of God, the great value and truth-
creating force that he was, shuffles in an intense feeling of social and cultural anomie, the feeling 
of detachment from a fundamental agent of order.  Stevens asserts that belief, even the great 
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belief in God, “has always been in a fiction” (Letters 370).  Poetry is no less a fiction, but its’ 
major difference is that it is “recognized” as such.  This is the basis for Stevens’ conception of 
the redemptive nature of the poem.  It is that which springs from the pressure between the 
imagination and reality, embodying both.   
He defends his fiction in the lecture, “Two or Three Ideas,” asserting, “In an age of 
disbelief...it is for the poet to supply the satisfactions of belief, in his measure and in his style” 
(CPP 841).  After the death of God, poetry is that force which takes upon itself the responsibility 
of reordering the world, and the poet is the ennobled figure with capacity to create this “new 
reality” (CPP 844).  In the Adagia, he writes, “After one has abandoned a belief in God, poetry is 
that essence which takes its place as life’s redemption” (CPP 901).  After God, poetry becomes 
the ultimate value because of the curative and cleansing myths it is capable of spinning.  Miller 
rightly points out that, “In defining poetry as a substitute for religion Stevens is joining himself 
to a tradition extending from the romantics through Matthew Arnold down to our own day” 
(Miller Poets of Reality 24).  Arnold predicts in 1895 that “...most of what now passes with us 
for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry” (3).  Stevens’ conception of the poem 
and its redemptive qualities is very much the same, though less of a prediction than a reality, one 
that Stevens embodies himself in his poetry.  
 Stevens first finds a name for the redemptive satisfaction of the poem in 1923 with the 
publication of Harmonium, his first collection of poetry.  In the poem, “To a High-Toned Old 
Christian Woman,” the narrator addresses this woman of faith and, in the very first line, bluntly 
announces, “Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame” (CPP 47).  Stevens writes, in a letter, “By 
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supreme fiction, of course, I mean poetry”4 (Letters 407).  This is the supreme fiction, Stevens’ 
new experiment with poetry that brings a much-needed order back into a society suffering under 
a lack of focus and a total lack of belief, but a fervent need for both.  Poetry is supreme in that it 
is light, life affirming, earth affirming, playful, enchanting, mysterious, and, most of all, aware of 
its own fictiveness.  And further, the poem is such an effortless and agreeable thing in which to 
believe.  Stevens proclaims, “...how easy it is suddenly to believe in the poem as one has never 
believed in it before, suddenly to require of it a meaning beyond what its words can possibly say, 
a sound beyond any giving of the ear, a motion beyond our previous knowledge of feeling” (CPP 
845).   
Stevens’ poetic development of the supreme fiction, of this new kind of poetry that rises 
to sit upon God’s vacated throne, re-enchanting reality by introducing order and fresh metaphor, 
has to it an integral component that is necessarily performative.  And in his great poem, “Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction,” Stevens gets at the nucleus of the matter, informing and illustrating, 
“in his measure and in his style,” how the poem weaves its magic.  As Stevens writes, “It is 
implicit in the title that there can be such a thing as a supreme fiction,” and in “Notes,” he sets 
out to show us how (Letters 430). 
 
                                                 
4
 It is perhaps worth noting, or, at the very least humorous to note, that Stevens had a bit of an 
argument with himself as to the exact definition of his supreme fiction, whether or not he meant 
precisely and only poetry.  There is not much to be gained by examining his rhetoric in the body 
of this project because he seems so uncertain with himself, and because overall, he does imply 
the supreme fiction as poetry.  I am copying here a series of letters in which Stevens examines 
and reexamines the definition of his fiction: 
 -“By supreme fiction, of course, I mean poetry” (407) 
 -“I have no idea of the form that a supreme fiction would take...Of course, in the long run, 
poetry would be the supreme fiction…” (430). 
 -“I ought to say that I have not defined a supreme fiction.  A man as familiar with my things as 
you are will be justified in thinking that I mean poetry.  I don’t want to say that I don’t mean 
poetry.  I don’t know what I mean” (435). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Notes on The Supreme Fiction 
Wine and music are not good until afternoon.  But poetry is like prayer in that it is 
most effective in solitude and in the times of solitude as, for example, in the 
earliest morning (CPP 903). 
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
In his essay on Stevens, “The Realistic Oriole,” Northop Frye rightly states, “Wallace 
Stevens was a poet for whom the theory and practice of poetry were inseparable” (Frye 161).  
His poetry and prose meld together in that they so perfectly inform each other, achieving a final 
eloquence of a single fulfillment, their collective movement toward the supreme fiction.  Stevens 
felt perfectly comfortable composing deeply fraught and complex essays on the nature of truth, 
of reality, of poetry.  He felt equally comfortable letting his poetry communicate these same 
theoretical messages themselves, in addition to the other satisfactions they were tasked with 
providing as fulfillments of the supreme fiction.   
In “The Man with the Blue Guitar,”  a poem in thirty-three cantos, he writes, “Poetry is 
the subject of the poem,” and this is continually true for Stevens (CPP 144).  No other poet 
writes so tirelessly and with such constancy about little else but poetry, so that his poems are 
themselves a central part of his vast poetic theory.  Stevens insists, also, that all of his poems be 
read, as he states in “A Primitive Like an Orb,” as one “central poem,” in which “one poem 
proves another and the whole” (CPP 378).  Critics and commentators call this the “grand poem,” 
a title Stevens had originally proposed for Harmonium, but that was rejected (Chiasson).  This is 
the way I will treat Stevens’ poems, as parts of a larger whole.   
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I am interested in the qualities of a poetry that takes the place of God, of a supreme 
fiction.  In Stevens’ words, “What, then, is the nature of poetry in a time of disbelief?” (CPP 
846).  In this analysis, it is my aim to take the themes provided in “Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction,” hereafter referred to as “Notes,” and to cast a wider net, pulling in new themes, and 
other poems that embody these themes, in whole and in part.  For each Stevensian imperative of 
the supreme fiction, I will analyze one shorter poem in its entirety that encapsulates some 
essential characteristic of this imperative.  Beneath the section heading, I will reference one or 
two short stanzas from that theme in “Notes,” without commentary.  I will also bring in parts of 
longer poems, brief vignettes, to elucidate and expound upon that theme.  When necessary and 
instructive, I may also refer to some secondary source, to a critic who provides a well-thought 
reading of a particular poem. 
I will include a brief section to draw parallel between each imperative of the supreme 
fiction and a belief Nietzsche embodied, or a value he held.  My aim here, is decidedly not to 
insist upon a Nietzschean reading of Stevens, neither is it my intention to oversimplify of 
underappreciate either Nietzsche or Stevens.  I have established, already, several points of 
divergence between the two, and those will also be apparent in the poems.  Instead, I seek to 
bring Stevens and Nietzsche together, for the purpose of this project, into a final coexistence, 
however loose, incomplete, or inconclusive the connection may seem.   
I want, finally, to acknowledge that these are “Notes” and are essentially incomplete.  My 
goal is to widen Stevens’ scope, to begin the long process of ordering the grand poem, of 
conceiving “the opposite of chaos in chaos,” as is the task of the poet (CPP 737). 
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Section One: It Must be Abstract 
There is a project for the sun.  The sun 
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be 
In the difficulty of what it is to be. 
…  
There was a muddy centre before we breathed, 
There was a myth before the myth began, 
Venerable and articulate and complete. 
Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz 
The truth is that there comes a time 
When we can mourn no more over music  
That is so much motionless sound. 
 
There comes a time when the waltz  
Is no longer a mode of desire, a mode 
Of revealing desire and is empty of shadows. 
 
Too many waltzes have ended.  And then 
There’s that mountain-minded Hoon,  
For whom desire was never that of the waltz, 
 
Who found all form and order in solitude, 
For whom the shapes were never the figures of men. 
Now, for him, his forms have vanished. 
 
There is order in neither sea nor sun. 
The shapes have lost their glistening. 
There are these sudden mobs of men, 
 
These sudden clouds of faces and arms, 
An immense suppression, freed, 
These voices crying without knowing for what, 
 
Except to be happy, without knowing how, 
Imposing forms they cannot describe, 
Requiring order beyond their speech. 
 
Too many waltzes have ended.  Yet the shapes 
For which the voices cry, these, too, may be 
Modes of desire, modes of revealing desire. 
 
Too many waltzes—The epic of disbelief 
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Blares oftener and soon, will soon be constant. 
Some harmonious skeptic soon in a skeptical music 
 
Will unite these figures of men and their shapes 
Will glisten again with motion, the music 
Will be motion and full of shadows. 
 
Analysis 
I see this poem as lending itself to be broken roughly into three parts.  Together, they 
express the chain of events in a world newly freed of its deity, the world in which the poet must 
learn to build a new language.  The metaphor of the waltz is utilized to make a very abstract 
concept, that of the particular satisfactions supplied by poetry, expressible in language.  The first 
four stanzas form the first part of the poem.  These lines have an expository strain and feel a bit 
like taking stock.  There is an awareness that something ‘has ended,’ that there is a 
disenchantment going on, that the world is being emptied of its shadows.  Lost is the “mode of 
desire” and the “mode of revealing desire.”  This is the waltz.   
 If the first four stanzas carry an explicating force and are taking stock of the shadowless 
world, then the second part pertains to the chaos that ensues when the waltzes have ended.  There 
are “mobs of men” crying out, yet not knowing what for.  Stevens describes this time as a time of 
freedom, of “an immense suppression, freed,” as though the waltz had humanity in chains.  But 
this was a myth, a suppression, of an immense ordering force, allowing humanity to operate 
under pretenses that seemed its own.  When the ordering force of the waltz is toppled, there is a 
freedom so immense that it actually binds.  If man had constantly to operate under the burden of 
existential awareness—stating infinity in the face at every moment—even the simplest tasks 
would likely prove impossible.  There is a necessary ordering force, allowing man to focus on 
the menial, everyday, and file away these other, grander thoughts.  When that ordering force—in 
this case, the waltz—disappears, one must come face to face with the indifferent silence of a 
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world.  That is the business of this second part of the poem, the masses in plea for some kind of 
structure, “requiring order beyond their speech.”  But these masses don’t have the words to order 
their universe, are not even aware that it is order they seek. 
In the third part of the poem, comprising the final three stanzas, there emerges the figure 
who can produce order.  There is a sense, in this eighth stanza, that the voices and the crying 
become “modes of desire, modes of revealing desire.”  These cries, perhaps, do have some 
ordering force, like the waltz, but are not grand enough, don’t cover enough ground.  Stevens, in 
a letter, writes, “In trying to create something as valid as the idea of God has been, and for that 
matter remains, the first necessity seems to be breadth” (435).  The voices from these “sudden 
mobs of men” trace some outline, but they have nowhere near the breadth necessary to order a 
world, to create the sense of purpose necessary for all.  Stevens writes that these voices are 
crying for “shapes,” undoubtedly for the forms they have lost, their gods, their idols, their law on 
golden tablets.  Again, in part three, there is a sense of a certain death of meaning, a disbelief 
blaring “oftener and soon.”  In the final four lines, the hero emerges to “unite these figures of 
men and their shapes.”  This hero is that same mountain-minded Hoon from stanza three.  He is 
Wallace Stevens himself.  He is the poet of modernity re-enchanting the world, filling it with all 
the little shadows and mysteries that man needs to survive.  He is Zarathustra, descending the 
mountain to preach a new message to his flock.    
Nietzschean Veil 
For Nietzsche, finding pleasure in difficulty is paramount, and this is evident in virtually 
all of his philosophy.  In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche concentrates a good deal of his 
energy on sorting out his position on silence, secrecy, and a kind of willed misunderstanding.  He 
writes, “Whatever is profound loves masks” (40).  The mask, in Nietzsche is a playful imposition 
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between the self and the world, a concrete affirmation of the unknowable.  Rather than lamenting 
the mask, as might be typical of the very philosophic truth-seeking project Nietzsche despises, 
Nietzsche celebrates the mask for the beauty it brings to the world and for the questions it refuses 
to answer.  “Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being 
misunderstood,” writes Nietzsche (BGE 290).  Profundity, for Nietzsche, strives for a “citadel 
and a secrecy,” for a “burial in silence” (BGE 26, 40).  Nietzsche praises the idea of--and in 
some ways embodied--the hermit philosopher who violently refuses to be understood, who 
favors silence as a safety and great preserver of profundity. 
Also a part of his depth philosophy is an appreciation for surfaces, for their beauty, their 
protection, and for the hint they provide of something underneath.  Nietzsche extols the endless 
surface, the perpetual continuum of layer and veils.  “Oh, those Greeks!  They knew how to 
live,” he exclaims in the Preface to The Gay Science, “Those Greeks were superficial--out of 
profundity!”  He praises the Greeks for their construction of an intricate, personal heaven filled 
with imperfect gods hopelessly muddled in human affairs, sometimes part human themselves.  
He praises, even, the forms, the idea of an ultimate surface upon which all others are based.  
Profundity is the goal, continually, in Nietzsche.  But a stopping-off to admire and appreciate the 
surface for its enchantments and its mediation is also crucial and a key impetus for Nietzsche’s 
appreciation of art. 
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Section Two: It Must Change 
Violets, doves, girls, bees and hyacinths 
Are inconstant objects of inconstant cause 
In a universe of inconstancy. 
 
The Motive for Metaphor 
You like it under the trees in autumn, 
Because everything is half dead. 
The wind moves like a cripple among leaves  
And repeats words without meaning. 
 
In the same way, you were happy in spring, 
With the half colors of quarter-things 
The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds, 
The single bird, the obscure moon-- 
 
The obscure moon lighting an obscure world 
Of things that would never be quite expressed, 
Where you yourself were never quite yourself 
And did not want nor have to be, 
 
Desiring the exhilarations of changes: 
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from 
The weight of primary noon, 
The A B C of being, 
 
The ruddy temper, the hammer 
Of red and blue, the hard sound-- 
Steel against intimation--the sharp flash, 
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X. 
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Analysis 
First, the “Metaphor” in the title can be read as a metonymy for poetry.  In “Adagia,” 
Stevens’ collection of aphorisms, he writes, “poetry is metaphor.” and hence, the “Metaphor” in 
the title is actually just poetry (CPP 973).  The “motive for metaphor,” then, is the poet’s reason 
for writing poetry.   
This poem is written entirely in the second person, addressing an unidentified “you.”  
Stevens may mean to address the poet (himself) or the imagination; regardless, the “you” seems 
a clear reflection inward rather than a statement toward some separate character just outside the 
frame of the poem.  Stevens is referring, here, to his own imagination, his own poetic faculty, 
which thrives “under the trees in autumn.” 
  The opening three stanzas of the poem are occupied with states of incompleteness, of 
being in-between, or ambiguous.  The poem opens upon Autumn, a season of change or of 
transition, nestled between the harshness and severity of summer and winter.  The subject, this 
poetic imagination, clearly enjoys this place of flux, dwelling in things “half dead.”  Now the 
wind rushes through these fall leaves and “repeats words without meaning.”  Perhaps here there 
is an implication that words need not have meanings, that even the rustling of leaves can be 
gathered into words, though they may not signify anything recognizable. 
 The poem continues, skipping over the extreme winter.  In the second stanza, we 
experience spring, filled with incomplete images of the “half colors of quarter-things.”  In the 
same way the poet loved the fall, he loves the spring, with  “the slightly brighter sky, the melting 
clouds.”  These clouds are in the process of melting.  The sky is simply a little brighter than 
before.  There are no absolutes here, but instead solace in a world of flux states.  Stevens 
deliberately makes no mention of summer or winter and through this omission, it is clear that his 
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interest in primarily in these states of flux; this poem is about a poet’s appreciation, that which 
pushes him to write.  He has little interest, at the moment, in the static extremes that either 
season has to offer and would rather float in the moderation of fall and spring.  It becomes clear, 
in this second stanza, that Stevens is dealing with the imagination and reality dichotomy.  As a 
poet, Stevens is engaged deeply with both and, in certain poems, they come to represent seasons.  
The imagination, in this poem and in others, are the seasons in flux, that which must change like 
his supreme fiction.  Reality, which Stevens pronounces as “the ultimate value” in his Adagia is 
also a crucial element in his poetry.  But the imagination, here, is that which creates the impetus 
for metaphor, for poetry. 
 In stanza three, Stevens provides this image of “The obscure moon lighting an obscure 
world,/ Of things that would never be quite expressed.”  Here is the metaphorical realm, the 
imaginative dreamland full of inconsistencies and ambiguities, a world where nothing can be 
defined.  Further, this is not a world in which one is himself.  There is no necessity, or want, for 
revelation.  This “obscure world” is something to be celebrated.  It is a place where the poet can 
be the poet, and does not have constantly to be a citizen of the world.  This is Stevens’ own 
world of the imagination, where he is not rooted firmly in reality, working as an insurance 
executive in Connecticut.  It is a place where he can celebrate the mastery of metaphor and live 
in uncertainty, perhaps even travel to Basel. 
 Here is the explicating force in stanza four.  The motive is finally revealed.  Stevens 
writes, “Desiring the exhilarations of changes:/ The motive for metaphor.”  First, the repetition 
of the title draws attention to itself, and the colon after the first line indicates space for a 
definition.  “The Motive for Metaphor” is change and the excitement it brings.  Poetry is 
inspired, thus, by things in flux, such as they are in fall and spring.  This is the central statement 
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of the poem.  In a letter, Stevens writes about how this poem expands upon one of the sections in 
“Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction”: “This [The Motive for Metaphor] is an illustration of the last 
remark that the essence of change is that it gives pleasure; that it exhilarates…” (CPP 430).    
 Here, in the middle of the fourth stanza, there is a marked shift in the poem’s language, 
suggesting a shift in subject.  Words like “leaves,” and “spring,” and “clouds,” become “temper,” 
“hammer,” “steel.”  There is a threat, something from which to “shrink.” These images that 
follow are all oppositional to the poet’s metaphorical realm.  First there is “the weight of primary 
noon.”  Like middle C on a piano, “primary noon” refers to the absolute midpoint in the cycle of 
a day.  Though it is an in-between period, Stevens is emphasizing its position as the peak of the 
day, its climax when all events are in stasis, neither rising nor falling.  The poet “shrinks” from 
this definitive and static reality. 
 Next, there is “The A B C of being.”  He wants to dwell in an obscure world where 
nothing can be understood completely, even himself.  However, “A B C” suggests a simplicity 
that is utterly contrary to Stevens’ complex vision of reality.  It implies a breaking down of the 
self into its basic parts, and denying the beauty of intricacy.  Additionally, when Stevens’ uses 
“A B C” here, and the letter “X” at the conclusion of the poem, the polarity of these letters 
represents the very extremes that he shrinks from, like summer and winter.   
 In this fifth and last stanza, Stevens continues to list the images of reality that interrupt 
the metaphorical musings.  These images become increasingly harsh and abrasive as they 
overwhelm the poet’s more subtle, imaginative side.  The only semblance of his metaphorical 
world remaining in this stanza is the image of “intimation,” a subtle and intricate hint, battling 
against “steal.”  This in addition to the other jarring images of “temper,” a “hammer,” a “hard 
sound,” and a “sharp flash,” suggests that reality is winning a battle against metaphor.  These 
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harsh images, especially the sharp sounds, also suggest an unpleasant sort of waking up to 
reality.   
 And after all of these clashing and discordant images comes one last rendering of “ The 
vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X.”  This is the reality that ultimately takes hold in the end.  
Stevens acknowledges here, perhaps, that it is not possible to live solely in metaphor.  Even 
though reality can be vile and unpleasant, it is still both “vital” and “dominant,” a necessity for a 
livable life.  But poetry must change, must be constantly in flux, ready for this battle with reality, 
with the hammer.  The “X,” in addition to representing in this poem an extreme, is also a 
metaphor for reality, a necessary reality.  It is a necessary reality from which there is also a need 
for a necessary angel, the poet, to take humanity away into a world that is constantly in flux and 
that, therefore, gives pleasure.  Stevens is engaged in this poem with the supreme fiction and 
with its performance, bringing out a poem that celebrates the metaphorical world, but places it 
beside reality, which is also necessary.  Reality is not everything, yet it is the basis of everything, 
and there is, after the satisfactions of the poem, a necessary return to the real.  But the poem 
makes that more possible. 
Nietzschean Metamorphosis 
I would like to write a few words on the Nietzschean concept of the Three 
Metamorphoses from the very beginning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as they so perfectly 
encapsulate this idea of the necessity of change.  The three metamorphoses of the spirit is the 
process by which the spirit becomes the camel, the camel becomes the lion, and the lion becomes 
the child.  The camel is an ascetic, Christ-like figure, abandoning the comforts of life to wander 
deep into the desert.  The camel must learn to love those who despise him and to take on the 
greatest burdens of life.  Next, the lion is the creature of independence, of the will, who battles 
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and vanquishes the old values of the dragon on whose scales shines “values, thousands of years 
old” (27).  But, the lion can only destroy; he cannot create.  The child is the final step of the 
metamorphoses; the child is the new creator of value and the symbol of innocence and a new 
beginning.  The child is the yes-sayer.  
 In some ways, the three metamorphoses follow rather uncannily the path to the death of 
God.  First, there is the obedient camel, who learns to face the burdens of the old structures 
without question.  Then, the lion wills and questions, and ultimately sends the gods tumbling out 
of the sky.  But then, there is the unbearable chaos.  In Nietzsche’s philosophy, that is where art, 
namely poetry, finds its purpose; it saves us from the overwhelm emerging out of the truth.  The 
child, by this line of analysis, might even be taken for the poet, whose role is to create new and 
skeptical illusion.  
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Section Three: It Must Give Pleasure 
And we enjoy like men, the way a leaf 
Above the table spins its constant spin, 
So that we look at it with pleasure, look 
 
At it spinning its eccentric measure.  Perhaps, 
The man-hero is not the exceptional monster, 
But he that of repetition is most master. 
…   
Fat girl, terrestrial, my summer, my night, 
How is it I find you in difference, see you there 
In a moving contour, a change not quite completed? 
 
The Man on the Dump 
Day creeps down.  The moon is creeping up. 
The sun is corbeil of flowers the moon Blanche 
Places there, a bouquet.  Ho-ho… The dump is full  
Of images.  Days pass like papers from a press. 
The bouquets come here in the papers.  So the sun,  
And so the moon, both come, and the janitor’s poems 
Of every day, the wrapper on the can of pears, 
The cat in the paper-bag, the corset, the box 
From Esthonia: the tiger chest, for tea. 
 
The freshness of night has been fresh a long time. 
The freshness of morning, the blowing of day, one says 
That it puffs as Cornelius Nepos reads, it puffs 
More than, less than or it puffs like this or that. 
The green smacks in the eye, the dew in the green 
Smacks like fresh water in a can, like the sea 
On a cocoanut--how many men have copied dew 
For buttons, how many women have covered themselves 
Wit dew, dew dresses, stones and chains of dew, heads 
Of the floweriest flowers dewed with the dewiest dew. 
One grows to hate these things except on the dump. 
 
Now, in the time of spring (azaleas, trilliums, 
Myrtle, viburnums, daffodils, blue phlox), 
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Between that disgust and this, between the things  
That are on the dump (azaleas and so on) 
And those that will be (azaleas and so on), 
One feels the purifying change.  One rejects 
The trash. 
 
 That’s the moment when the moon creeps up 
To the bubbling of bassoons.  That’s the time 
One looks at the elephant-colorings of tires. 
Everything is shed; and the moon comes up as the moon 
(All its images are in the dump) and you see 
As a man (not like an image of a man), 
You see the moon rise in the empty sky. 
 
One sits and beats an old tin can, lard pail, 
One beats and beats for that which one believes. 
That’s what one wants to get near.  Could it after all  
Be merely oneself, as superior as the ear 
To a crow’s voice?  Did the nightingale torture the ear, 
Pack the heart and scratch the mind?  And does the ear 
Solace itself in peevish birds? Is it peace, 
 
Is it a philosopher’s honeymoon, one finds 
On the dump?  Is it to sit among mattresses of the dead, 
Bottles, pots, shoes and grass and murmur aptest eve: 
Is it to hear the blatter of grackles and say 
Invisible priest; is it to eject, to pull 
The day to pieces and cry stanza my stone? 
Where was it one first heard of the truth?  The the. 
 
Analysis 
“The Man on the Dump” is an “ars poetica,” a poem completely about poetry.  In it, 
Stevens actualizes the work of his new poetics.  The poem itself follows the process of the 
creation of a supreme poetry, showing its reader—through one extended metaphor, the dump, 
and several smaller ones—the kind of transformations and distinctive breaks a supreme poetry 
must make from its predecessors.   
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Evening is arriving on the dump.  The dump is the place where all the images of the 
world are retired and go to die, to rot.  They are stale, trite, overused.  In the first stanza, Stevens 
interjects a mocking “Ho-ho…” to express actual recoil from the bland image he has just 
presented, a “bouquet” of flowers.  “The dump is full/ Of images.”  Here is just the scene, the 
dump, in evening, teeming with images.  As the stanza closes, there are some more attractive and 
compelling images.  “The cat in the paper-bag,” expresses both on its own a curious sort of 
image, but also carries with it association of metaphor: “let the cat out of the bag.”  Or maybe it 
is Schrödinger’s cat.   
“The freshness of night has been fresh a long time.”  The way poets write about the 
beauty and newness, the excitement of the nighttime has itself become stale, caught in a loop of 
poetic tradition.  Yes, the night is fresh and lovely.  But it has been fresh for an exceptionally 
long time, in exactly the same way.  The “blowing of the day,” “puffs” in a rather indifferent 
way, uncaring or unaware of its own puffing.  Now, the reader is literally hit in the face with an 
image, “The green smacks in the eye.”  That nature is “green” and full of “dew,” the “dewiest 
dew,” is so often articulated that it has become an invasive metaphor, an image so used that 
reading it reproduced again is an actual blow to the eyes.  Stevens pokes fun, here, at the attempt 
to get at the thing one wants to express by using the same words to their extremities, by trying to 
out-do the poetic tradition, so to speak, without fundamentally changing anything: “...heads/ Of 
the floweriest flowers dewed with the dewiest dew.”  This stanza ends, however, with an actual 
sense of freshness, of a new poetic vitality.  There is the possibility that on the dump, these 
images can be appreciated differently, perhaps even transformed. 
Springtime arrives.  Amid these stale metaphors, the “azaleas and so on,” “One feels the 
purifying change.”  How?  “One rejects/ The trash.”  One would assume it was all trash, but 
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there is a distinction here between “the trash” and the rest of what is on the dump, that which is 
producing this “purifying change.”  Presumably the trash is that collection of images that has 
been completely emptied of significance and washed up in poetic practice, such that it can no 
longer be of any use to this man on the dump. 
 “That’s the moment…”  There is a moment, present, crystallized in time, drawn out from 
the rest as a defining occasion.  It is another moonrise, but unlike the one at the beginning of the 
poem.  The moon is not compared to anything; again it creeps up, but “as the moon.”  There is 
no need to clothe it as anything other than what it is.  This man on the dump, who is the poet, the 
artificer in all of this, concocts a new and pristine image: the “bubbling of bassoons.”  It is a 
purposefully obscure, unused image.  As are the “elephant-colorings of tires,” a metaphor that 
operates on the places of both sight and touch, texture.  Crucial to note, also, is that the sky is 
“empty.”  The image of the clear sky is one Stevens sometimes uses to mark the absence of gods.  
There are no longer any gods clattering around above the dump.  It is a place of purity, where 
“Everything is shed.”  The man can see the moon as it is because he has dispensed with all its 
images. 
Here is a primal image, madly beating at “an old tin can” for “that which one believes.”  
The stuff that is on the dump, the trash that is not really trash, is portrayed here as essential, as 
somehow all that man has.  This belief for which one beats and beats is suddenly “what one 
wants to get near.”  But this is a new belief, with new images, an essential imagination.  Stevens 
takes this chance to poke fun at the poetic tradition of Romanticism, which had an obsession 
with the nightingale.  Now that the nightingale is “peevish,” the poem moves to an unmediated 
place.  It seems as though the reader has caught up to the man, has grabbed onto the train of his 
thought and followed it directly to it source.  His questions are genuine and immediate.   
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 What is it “one finds/ On the dump?”  The answer seems to be something like 
creation.  In the final stanza, there are hints of a new creation story affirming new values that is 
composed by this man, right on the dump.  He mutters to himself among piles, taking on a 
linguistic power over naming that is attributed Biblically to Adam.  His whispers at the end of 
the poem are extremely difficult to unpack, and are intentionally so.  “Aptest eve”: If the man on 
the dump is some, new manifestation of an Adam, his first task would be to name Eve.  
“Invisible priest”: Perhaps this place is still haunted by the shadow of a divinity.  Another 
possible interpretation is that the priest, mediator between man and his God, has fallen away.  
“Stanza my stone”: The poem becomes the new base, the new immortality, taking the place of 
the philosopher’s stone, the religious man’s rock.   
“Where was it one first heard of the truth?  The the.”  It would be impossible to provide a 
sure interpretation of this final line of “The Man on the Dump.”  It is interesting to approach it, 
though, from the angle purely of language.  Nietzsche writes, in “Twilight of the Idols,” “I am 
afraid we are not rid of God because we still have grammar” (Portable 483).  This poem wholly 
embodies the supreme fiction, in its abstractness, its transformations, and its strong sense of 
affirmation.  It is poem about the task of the poet to create new values through fresh image and 
metaphor. It is also a poem in which God is absent.   It is curious, then, that the structural 
components of language seem to be falling apart at the finale.  Perhaps this is Stevens 
experimenting with that very idea, using the conditions brought about by the absence of God to 
bend other kinds of order, such as grammar.   
Nietzschean Affirmation 
 Nietzsche affirms pleasure just as much as he affirms pain.  In fact, he usually views the 
two as fundamentally intertwined, one as a necessity for the other.  Only through the often-
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painful experience of certain extremes—a kind of pain Nietzsche describes in The Gay Science 
as a kind of burning “over green wood”—is it possible for man to affirm pleasure in this new 
way, after rejecting all that is mild.  This is central to Nietzschean philosophy.  He depicts this 
phenomenon of rebirth in section four of The Gay Science: 
...From such abysses, from such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe 
suspicion, one returns newborn, having shed one’s skin, more ticklish and 
malicious, with a more delicate taste for joy, with a tenderer tongue for all good 
things, with merrier senses, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more 
childlike yet a hundred times subtler than one has ever been before. 
This descent Nietzsche describes is an essential part to his philosophy of overcoming.  One 
thinks of Zarathustra’s task of continually climbing so that he can again descend to his depths, 
and to a people he must direct.  Also, of Zarathustra’s long, painful acceptance of the eternal 
return, culminating in “The Convalescent,” where he achieves a new sensitivity, becomes like a 
child again.  This is the process of which Nietzsche continually speaks, a health and a pleasure 
that comes out of sickness and suspicion.   
 Nietzsche’s philosophy is one of affirmation, of a final yes-saying to the body and to the 
world.  He is interested in breaking those old tablets of religion he views as saying “no” to these 
things and hiding behind the shame of a pious dogma.  Zarathustra proclaims, “And we should 
consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once.  And we should call every 
truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh” (210).  It is not surprising, then, 
that when Nietzsche attempts a criticism of his own work, he expresses a wish that he would 
have sung his words and not written them.  For Nietzsche, there is a certain gaiety made possible 
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through great pain, a delight in the surfaces which only becomes possible after descending to the 
depths.   
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CONCLUSION 
Here I am, finished, with so much more to be said.  But I guess that is not so uncommon 
a predicament, neither is it such a terrible place to find oneself.  There is always more to be said, 
especially in a project framed by the inexpressible, whose premise to grasp at—through the 
limits of language—a something metaphysical, redemptive, godly, a something that is 
axiomatically beyond explanation.   
Nietzsche recognized the necessity of language as both a freedom and as a burden, a 
limit, and a threat.  His fundamental concern was to keep words in flux, to prevent them, at all 
costs, from standing still.  What he hated above all else were words and metaphors that became 
canonized, truthful, and dogmatized, in other words, mild:  “What then, is truth?  A mobile army 
of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms-...” (“On Truth and Lie”).  His aim in the 
essay, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” is to call to attention the fictiveness of words, 
to articulate how they are invented to express the thing in itself, but are eventually confused for 
the thing in itself and crowned as truths.  Language is a moving target, a “mobile army of 
metaphors,” a continual falling short, the painting of a shadowy question mark at the end of 
every certitude.  Nietzsche’s project was the project of the madman, swinging a lantern into the 
streets at noontime, and of the philosopher swinging a hammer by night.  His task was to break 
into apathy, into all that was slow, lethargic, sanctified, crystallized in a castle of infallibility.  He 
took a swing at philosophy and its project for truth, and at poetry for its inability to let go of old, 
dead gods. 
Stevens believed equally in the necessity for language, for a poetics that would overcome 
nihilism in the wake of a departed God.  But Stevens saw this not as a matter of sickness, health, 
and moral value, but simply as a desperate need for order, for a reworking and re-enchantment of 
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the world through the “benign illusion” supplied by poetry.  Stevens, responding to this need, 
works out for himself a poetic theory and practice, the supreme fiction, a poetics of freshness, a 
poetics that “rejects the trash” (CPP 185).  And Stevens’ conception of the supreme fiction has 
some important points of intersection with Nietzsche, specifically in how they both choose to 
deal with God’s death through art that takes up an almost celestial importance, but that carries a 
crucial element of skepticism and lightness.  Each confer praise upon art that is abstract, that 
changes, and that gives pleasure.  The art emphasized by both Nietzsche and Stevens carries key 
affirmations of the world, the body, and of some third category of shadow, a perpetual movement 
that takes the place of mysticism and has as its mission to re-enchant the world. 
But Nietzsche simply extols this.  He is the bridge, the harbinger, the one who delivers an 
the important message: “God is dead.”  He exists and writes in a world that is fading away just as 
he fades, disappearing behind his text.  Stevens embodies a step beyond the message.  His poetry 
is actually the embodiment of a new kind of faith, wholly irreverent, gaudy, skeptical, 
metaphoric, and necessarily redemptive.  Poetry, the supreme fiction, is that essentially artful 
belief to which Nietzsche points.  With Wallace Stevens, in his prose and in his poetry, the 
Nietzschean injunction for a deified art is at last realized.  Stevens is the poet of the future, not 
wholly Nietzschean, but certainly responding to a Nietzschean fearlessness and commitment to 
uncertainty 
 In my project, I have discussed the Nietzschean dictum, “God is dead.”  I have explored 
its interpretations, its consequences, and the threat of nihilism that inevitably follows in its wake.  
I have looked at the varied responses of existentialist philosophers, culminating in the 
Nietzschean response, the movement toward a deified art.  I have examined the thought-project 
of Stevens, studying his relationship to philosophy, his version of the death of God and of the 
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nobility of the poet, and the productive agitation between reality and the imagination.  And I 
have given a reading of the theoretical framework supreme fiction, the invented faith system 
which is abstract, changes, gives pleasure, and which ultimately supplies the satisfaction of 
belief.  All of this lays the groundwork for the necessarily performative work of the supreme 
fiction, work that Stevens explains in the prose and accomplishes, or rather, undertakes, in the 
poetry.   
I wanted, presently, to write a project that was deeply investigative, wholly embroiled in 
the poetry.  But the context called for attention, much attention.  Nietzsche’s death of God was 
not clear on its own.  That needed explaining, as did Stevens’ conception of it.  The problems 
presented by God’s disappearance, both to poetry and philosophy, were not obvious.  They 
needed explaining.  The individual approaches of Nietzsche and Stevens to truth and to language 
warranted attention, as well.  The chapters printed here have been a very necessary foundation 
for the work of this project, but, with regard to the poetry, I fell short of what I ultimately wanted 
to accomplish.  I would have liked to have cast a wider net, to have given myself time to analyze 
more of Stevens’ poetry. 
This project is complete.  It stands as a whole.  But, given time, I hope to make it part of 
a larger whole, of a project that not only lays out the groundwork for a poetic theology, but also 
investigates and assesses the supreme fiction in practice, in its performative aspect.  The 
consequent section to this project, as I see it, would be composed of several sections, each an 
intricate study within the poetry of a single component to Stevens’ fiction, each connecting back 
to a key facet of Nietzschean philosophy, such as perspectivism, yes-saying, affirmation of the 
world, of the body.   
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The premise of this project, all that I have said and tried to say, is this--that language, 
however imperfect, lying, and illusory, creates truth and is everything we have.  Cling to words, 
even as they wax, wane, disappear entirely.  Cling to words and delight in their transformations, 
their volatilities, their flightiness.  Cling to words and know that they are not real nor are they 
perfect.  But also know that they are exactly what is needed in every moment.  I chose for the 
title of this project, “stanza my stone,” because it so perfectly encapsulates a belief in poetry, a 
feeling of affection and of love, that I have long shared, but struggled to put into words.   
 
In poetry, you must love the words, the ideas and the images and rhythms with all your capacity 
to love anything at all  
    -Wallace Stevens  
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